Overcoming Hurdles to Cross-Strait Ties: A Chinese Mainland Perspective

Shao Yuqun    source：Global Asia

BETWEEN AUGUST 2022 and the end of last year, China conducted a series of military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. Some policy analysts and media outlets interpreted these actions as progressively tightening control over Taiwan Island, arguing that Beijing was forcefully altering the “status quo” in the strait and laying the groundwork for potential reunification by military means. From Beijing’s standpoint, the military exercises were primarily intended to counter external interference, most notably former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, Washington’s substantial arms sales to Taipei and the separatist rhetoric and policy initiatives advanced by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities. China views these military maneuvers as deterrent measures designed to stabilize conditions in the Taiwan Strait and preserve regional peace.

At the same time, Beijing coupled the exercises with explicit reassurances, underscoring the continuity and stability of its broader policy approach. For example, on Aug. 10, 2022, the Chinese government released a white paper titled “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era,” which states that “National reunification by peaceful means is the first choice of the CPC [Communist Party of China] and the Chinese government in resolving the Taiwan question, as it best serves the interests of the Chinese nation as a whole, including our compatriots in Taiwan, and it works best for the long-term stability and development of China.”1

President Xi Jinping said in his 2026 New Year message: “We Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait share a bond of blood and kinship. The reunification of our motherland, a trend of the times, is unstoppable!” Some observers have expressed concern about the latter part of this statement, interpreting it as a sign that Beijing is eager to pursue reunification. But the interpretation offered by the Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson merits attention: “With the comprehensive advancement of national development and the process of national rejuvenation, we have greater capability, stronger confidence, and firmer resolve to turn this aspiration into reality.” This articulation indicates that the mainland possesses both the strategic confidence and the patience required to address the Taiwan question.

In conjunction with the “Mission of Justice 2025” military exercises held from Dec. 29 to Dec. 31, 2025, Beijing also issued reassurances underscoring its commitment to further strengthening cross-strait integration. The announcement by the State Council Tariff and Duty Committee regarding the 2026 tariff adjustment plan explicitly confirmed that the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement would continue to be implemented as stipulated. Moreover, Taiwan Affairs Office Director Song Tao identified as the top priority for the office in the current year the creation of more favorable conditions for Taiwanese to study, work and live on the mainland, alongside efforts to expand exchanges, deepen co-operation and advance integration.2

While pursuing a dual approach of reassurance and deterrence, the Chinese government also attaches great importance to the “reassurances” offered by the US government and the Taiwan authorities. Of course, at different times in the development of China-US relations and cross-strait relations, the assurances that China hopes to receive are different. In this essay, I will analyze the mainland side’s specific ideas, needs and demands for reassurance at the current stage.

REASSURANCE FROM THE US

First of all, the US should seek long-term peaceful coexistence with China. The Taiwan question has been the most important and most sensitive, and sometimes most urgent, issue in China-US relations. China has always viewed US policy toward Taiwan in the context of US policy toward China; therefore, when China looks at Washington’s approach to the Taiwan question, it first looks at its handling of China-US relations. Both the first Donald Trump administration and the Joe Biden administration explicitly identified China as the principal strategic competitor, yet neither of them articulated what the end state of this competition might be — namely, how Washington would define or measure “victory” in its rivalry with Beijing. Last year, following China’s strong countermeasures against the imposition of excessively high tariffs, stabilizing bilateral relations became the primary policy objective of the second Trump administration. Reflecting this shift, the US National Security Strategy, released in November 2025, refrained from designating China as the main strategic competitor, instead employing the term “near peer.” Nevertheless, in practice, the Trump 2.0 administration has not ceased competition with China in domains such as technology, critical minerals and geopolitical influence.

At the same time, two persistent strands of thought within the US strategic community continue to cause concern in Beijing. One posits that conflict between a rising power and an established power is inevitable; the other contends that only fundamental changes to China’s political system would allow China-US relations to evolve in ways consistent with American interests. Although these perspectives remain outside the mainstream in Washington at present — Trump has repeatedly expressed his desire to avoid a Third World War, and the Republican Party has shown limited interest in “regime change” (despite the Trump administration’s intervention in Venezuela) — the complexity of US domestic politics and the broader international environment perpetuate Chinese anxieties regarding Washington’s ultimate strategic intentions. Beijing has already prepared, and will continue to prepare, strategic responses to such uncertainties. This fundamental indeterminacy concerning the trajectory of bilateral relations is particularly detrimental to the management between the two sides of the Taiwan question.

Second, the US will not obstruct peaceful cross-strait reunification to occur in its strategic competition with China. The US competition with China is primarily concentrated in four domains — geostrategic influence, technology, ideology (models of social governance), and the international order — all of which are closely linked to Taiwan. The US National Security Strategy underscores the importance of maintaining control over the “first island chain,” noting that “Taiwan provides a direct gateway to the second island chain.” This recalls the testimony of former US Assistant Secretary of Defense Ely Ratner before Congress in December 2021, when he said that “Taiwan is located at a critical node in the first island chain … that is critical to the region’s security and critical to the defense of vital US interests in the Indo-Pacific.”3 The implicit message is that Taiwan constitutes a strategic asset for the US, and that separating Taiwan from the Chinese mainland is essential for Washington to succeed in its competition with Beijing. Semiconductors represent one of the core battlegrounds in China-US competition. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), under intense pressure from both the Biden and Trump administrations, has been compelled to invest in fabrication facilities in the US and to continually expand its investment and production capacity. This demonstrates Washington’s determination not to allow the most advanced chip design and manufacturing to remain in Taiwan. From the perspective of the US strategic community, peaceful reunification across the Taiwan Strait would deprive the US of control over this critical strategic resource, an outcome deemed unacceptable.

Ideologically, the Biden administration framed cross-strait relations within a “democracy versus autocracy” narrative, attempting to redefine the Taiwan question from one of sovereignty and territory into one of ideology. Although Trump himself has shown little interest in Taiwan’s democratic system, the view persists within the US that “an authoritarian mainland cannot be permitted to unify with a democratic Taiwan.” As for the international order, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, Beijing maintains that peaceful reunification would still allow China and the US to coexist peacefully in the region. Yet many in Washington interpret such an outcome as signaling the end of US regional primacy. From both the Trump administration’s policies and ongoing debates in Washington, it is evident that US policy is moving in the direction of actively preventing peaceful cross-strait reunification. Should this continue, it would constitute a serious violation of the fundamental consensus that was reached when China and the US normalized diplomatic relations in 1979.

Third, the US should not support Taiwan independence. This is an important part of the US “One China” policy. Currently the difference between Washington and Beijing’s perceptions of Taiwan independence is widening. Beijing considers Taiwanese leader Lai Ching-te to be a dangerous advocate for Taiwan independence. Washington believes that, with Lai winning just 40 percent of the vote in the January 2024 election, and with the DPP losing its majority in the Legislative Yuan, he does not have the credibility or capability to push for independence. Some in Washington even think that Beijing is taking the opportunity to label Lai as a “Taiwan independence advocate” to increase the scale and frequency of military exercises in the Taiwan Strait and prepare for unification by force. The US worries about “de jure Taiwan independence” or “radical Taiwan independence.” It doesn’t think the “de-Sinicization” that former leader Tsai Ing-wen promoted on the island during her eight years in power is a way to push for Taiwan independence. Lai continues to vigorously promote the “normalization of Taiwan as an independent state” on the basis of Tsai’s “de-Sinicization.” He referred to the Chinese mainland as a “foreign hostile force” in a speech on March 13, 2025, reinforcing the narrative of “resisting China and protecting Taiwan.” He has been pushing for the construction of a “national security” legal system in the Legislative Yuan through revision of 10 laws, which include the “Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area” (the Cross-Strait Act).

The Taiwan version of “One Country, Two Systems” has been described as an untouchable red line within Taiwanese society by Lai. He has asserted that, on this basis, domestic political parties, legal entities and civic organizations should be subject to regulation in their exchanges and political dialogue with the mainland. At the same time, the DPP authorities have required that mainland spouses (a Chinese mainland resident who relocates to Taiwan for permanent settlement after marrying a Taiwanese resident) relinquish foreign nationality under Article 20 of the “Nationality Act” when assuming public office. Yet, for mainland spouses residing in Taiwan, the Cross-Strait Act stipulates only the cancellation of mainland household registration. Household registration and nationality are distinct legal categories: the mainland can issue proof of household deregistration but cannot provide certification of nationality loss. By exploiting this legal distinction, the DPP authorities construct a framework of “dual nationality,” thereby reframing cross-strait relations as relations between two sovereign states. All these are seen by Beijing as social mobilization to promote independence. If the process is not stopped as soon as possible, Taiwan society’s perception that “Chinese are foreigners” will be solidified, and public opinion will be highly antagonistic. Since 2017, Beijing has repeatedly cautioned Washington about the risks associated with incremental moves toward Taiwan independence. Yet the US has not only dismissed these warnings, but has also continued to expand arms sales to Taiwan and to deepen US-Taiwan military relations to strengthen deterrence against Beijing. It is now time to reconsider this approach.

REASSURANCE FROM TAIWAN

First, DPP authorities should abandon the “new two-state theory,” which claims that the Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are not subordinate to each other. The view of the Chinese mainland is that the central government of the PRC, established on Oct. 1, 1949, replaced the government of the ROC as the sole legitimate government of China and the sole legitimate representative of China in the international community. From the perspective of international law, the succession triggered by this momentous event was a succession of governments within a state in which a new regime replaced the old, not a secession where one region became a state of its own. There is still only one China. China’s status as a single subject of international law has not changed, nor have its sovereignty and territorial boundaries. During her second term, Tsai Ing-wen proposed that “ROC and PRC are not subordinate to each other,” meaning that the sovereignty and territorial boundaries of the ROC and PRC are separate and do not overlap. The Chinese mainland calls this argument the “new two-state theory,” in contrast to Li Teng-hui’s “two-state theory” from 1999, in which the then-leader of Taiwan said that Taiwan authorities had positioned cross-strait relations as a “state-to-state relationship, or at least a special country-to-country relationship.” Lai has inherited the “new two-state theory,” and both the old and new versions are different forms of Taiwan independence.

Second, the DPP authorities should abandon the claim that UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 did not resolve the issue of Taiwan’s representation in the UN. According to the DPP, Resolution 2758, as adopted by the 26th UN General Assembly in 1971, resolved only the issue of China’s representation, not that of Taiwan, on the grounds that the resolution not only made no mention of Taiwan, but also failed to mention that Taiwan was a part of the PRC, and that China has sovereignty over Taiwan. The view of the Chinese mainland is that after its defeat in 1945, Japan returned Taiwan to China in accordance with the spirit and requirements of the 1943 Cairo Declaration, the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation and the Emperor of Japan’s Instrument of Surrender. Since the ROC government was the central government of China at that time, it took over Taiwan from Japan on behalf of China, and Taiwan has since then been returned to China. In 1946, the Constitution of the ROC was promulgated in Nanjing, then the capital of China, and more than 10 “National Assembly Delegates” from Taiwan participated in the “constitution-making” and subsequent “constitution-execution,” making Taiwan constitutionally a part of the ROC’s inherent territory. When the PRC succeeded the ROC on Oct. 1, 1949, this naturally included sovereignty over Taiwan. Therefore, long before Resolution 2758 was adopted, it was already a mainstream international consensus that Taiwan was a part of China, and Resolution 2758 resolved the question of who holds China’s “right of representation,” which naturally did not include any specific reference to Taiwan.

The position of the DPP authorities is a continuation of the “Theory of the Undetermined Status of Taiwan,” which states that the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed between the Allied powers and Japan in 1951 is the legally binding treaty dealing with Taiwan’s sovereignty. The theory says that Japan only indicated in the treaty that it had renounced its sovereignty over Taiwan, but did not say that it would return Taiwan to China, therefore the status and future of Taiwan are still not determined. But Japan’s official stance on the treaty is fraught with contradictions. While regarding the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation as “historical origins,” it simultaneously replaces them with the San Francisco Peace Treaty as the international legal basis for addressing the Taiwan question. Moreover, while invoking the treaty as the legal foundation for handling Taiwan’s status, Japan has never relied on the same treaty as a legal basis in dealing with the Ryukyu Islands or its territorial disputes with Russia.

Third, the DPP authorities should stop the policy of decoupling economically and culturally from the Chinese mainland. After Lai took office, DPP authorities have prevented normal cross-strait people-to-people exchanges in the name of “opposing China’s United Front work.” While labeling the mainland as “foreign hostile forces,” Lai outlined 17 strategies to threaten people in Taiwan who support cross-strait exchanges. The vice mayor of Shanghai announced that the city government would actively promote Shanghai residents to visit Taiwan as tourists when he participated in the Taipei-Shanghai City Forum in December 2024. So far, DPP authorities have provided no feedback. The head of the Education Department in Taiwan publicly said that cross-strait exchanges for primary schools and middle schools should be avoided whenever possible. Scholars and experts who study cross-strait relations are almost totally banned from visiting the other side.

The lack of regular exchanges will easily lead to a high degree of division in public opinion on both sides, leading to misinterpretation and misjudgment of the other side’s intentions and strategic planning, causing a sharp rise in the risk of unintended military friction. It’s not only detrimental to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, but also extremely dangerous for the Asia-Pacific region and the world. DPP authorities should stop restricting exchanges between think tank researchers and academic scholars across the strait, as well as lift restrictions on educational, religious, entertainment, media and cultural exchanges, allowing people on both sides to genuinely reconnect and understand each other.

If Washington could take seriously Beijing’s concerns regarding the dangers of “incremental Taiwan independence” and reduce its military support for the DPP authorities, Beijing could in turn decrease the frequency — or scale — of its deterrence-oriented military operations in the Taiwan Strait as a reciprocal gesture.

The mainland can also conduct authorized Track II dialogues with scholars and former officials from the DPP. This is neither the “Red-Green dialogue,” with Red representing the Chinese mainland and Green denoting the DPP and its allies, which is often mentioned by the DPP-oriented media, nor a change in the mainland’s policy toward Taiwan. The purpose is to show Taiwan and the international community that the Taiwan question is fundamentally a political issue. If the DPP authorities do not accept the One China principle and the “1992 Consensus,” and cannot propose a positioning of cross-strait political relations that the mainland can accept, Beijing would still hope to maintain cross-strait communication in the form of Track II dialogues to prevent misreading and misjudgment, and to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

In these fraught times, it is crucial for maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait that the Chinese mainland, Taiwan and the US seek to reassure each other.