Evolving Thinking and Policies of China’s Diplomacy and China-EU Relations
2009/12/1
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In the past sixty years of the PRC diplomatic history, the Chinese thinking, policies and practices have always been in the process of changes and readjustments along with the developments both at home and abroad. In the first decade of the 21st Century, China is confronted with new environments with new opportunities and challenges. Looking ahead, both China and EU are preparing for bigger roles in the world but need to make more painstaking efforts.
I. Major Factors Shaping the Internal and External Environments of China’s Foreign Relations
First of all, China is undergoing great changes in its comprehensive national strength, social structures and people’s ways of living and thinking. After 60 years of development and construction, China's GDP ranks third in the world, accounting for 6.4% of the world economy; China’s import and export trade volume has risen to the third in the world, with its share of world trade standing at 7.9%. The average Chinese income has increased by more than 100 times. Population living in absolute poverty has decreased from 250 million in 1978 to 14.79 million in 2007, achieving ahead of schedule a number of United Nations Millennium Development Goals.
In the mere span of one generation, China has achieved what many others would have taken hundreds years to accomplish. However, these changes are double-edged. On the one hand, China has moved out of poverty and entered into a moderately better-off society with such remarkable progresses reflected by a broad range of accomplishments ranging from our networks of express ways to spaceships, and the number of our mobile phone holders to our rank on the Olympic medal board. On the other hand, exceptionally fast developments have caught many unready and unprepared. Some simply do not know what to do in the face of tremendous changes.
Moreover, China has become increasingly pluralistic and diversified in terms of social structure and spectrum. Ways of thinking and living vary from region to region, from group to group, and from sector to sector. Indeed, China is a mixture of the strong and weak, a coexistence of the pre-modern and post-modern, and a combination of the solutions and problems of many contemporary issues ranging from environment protection to disease epidemics.
Secondly, China finds itself in a new international environment. It is new because the contemporary configuration of powers is characterized by the relative downturn of the West and the relative prominence of the emerging powers. It is new because China has become a participant, constructor and reformer of the international system. It is new because China is not only expected to express its principled standings but also to map out concrete proposals for the global agendas.
Thirdly, obligations and responsibilities go hand in hand with prestige and rights. China has moved from the margin to the center of global arenas and international relations. Some major countries call for more contribution from China to global agendas. Many developing countries place great hopes on China for inspiration and assistance. Some Asian-Pacific countries propose joint-building of regional community. In fact, China’s goodwill to contribute to the peace and development in the world is not sufficiently matched by its capabilities and experiences. China needs both national strength and time to overcome a still significant learning curve.
Last but not least, China is confronted with many tough challenges of domestic and transnational natures. The biggest challenge comes from within rather than without. China strives to achieve sustainable development while maintaining stability and efficiency. China has paid a high cost for its current economic achievements and needs to shift for low carbon and green economy. Economic situation is closely linked with social status. Education, jobs, social welfare and healthcare are the accompanying challenges. Internationally, China needs to cope with the current financial crisis and prepare for the post-crisis challenges as well. The changing geopolitical landscapes, economic patterns and evolving thinking all call for China’s effective responses.
This feature of globalization has often made things more difficult and complicated. In this respect, there are three inter-changes. Firstly, domestic issues could easily turn into transnational ones. Foreign and international problems have domestic implications. Secondly, domestic and international agendas constitute another related interchange. For instance, at the time of current financial crisis and economic difficulties, trade and investment protectionism have become intertwined. Thirdly, there is interchangeability between high politics and low politics. Nowadays, climate change, environment protection and food security have been listed as top priorities on national and international agendas.
II. The Current World As China Sees It
The perception, generalization and conceptualization of the world play important roles in determining China’s strategies and policies of its relations with the outside world.
China sees the world developing more than ever towards multi-polarity. The reconfiguration of powers continues in the shifting of the center of gravities from the West to the East, the increasing trends of regionalism and cross-regional cooperation, along with the opposite movement of community-ism (fragmentation) and growing importance of the emerging powers, etc. The current financial crisis has accelerated this process. 20 years ago the overall GDP of the Group Seven made up 70-80% of the world total, whereas their share now has come down to 50-60%. In the year 2000, the combined GDP of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC’s) comprised about 8% of the world total, but now this figure has doubled. As a result, the emerging powers have gained in political and economic weight, thus adding new momentum to the ongoing process of multi-polarization.
China sees the importance of system- reforming and -building. In an era with peace and development as the main theme, most players are working on the construction of norms, regulations, laws, regimes, institutions and systems as a way of re-allocating rights and obligations. Facts have repeatedly shown that the existent international system has obvious insufficiency and needs to be improved in its breadth and depth. Moreover, to deal with new problems and issues, it requires the international society to cooperate in all-agreed framework and institutions. Although some people suggest that the W-shape or the double dips of current economic difficulties is very likely, many hold that the worst part of the financial crisis is over. Therefore, the world is increasingly focused on the post-crisis landscape and system arrangement. People are also talking about the so-called exit strategy, IMF and WB reforms and G-20 being envisioned as the main platform. Moreover, from Bali roadmap to Copenhagen conference, the world is seeking new and more effective ways to deal with the new challenge of climate change.
China sees greater challenges in the fields of development and security. The current financial crisis has hit both developed and developing countries alike, producing economic recession in both, intensified social contradictions and greater political instability. However, developing countries are in deeper economic troubles. This financial crisis has already increased the poverty population in almost 50 developing countries and about 200 million people return to below the poverty line. It can be expected that countries differ in, among other things, the rights of development, development models and future economic growth points. It can also be expected that trade and investment protectionism would gain more domestic support. Another thing that can be predicted is that in the context of economic difficulties various kinds of extremism and radicalism would rise.
In a related manner, the notion of security is expanded in definition coverage have been expanded nowadays. Security does not only mean military conflicts and wars but also reflects the challenges in combating terrorism, containing proliferation of weapons of massive destruction, dealing with climate change, ensuring food and energy supplies, and providing public health services, etc. Traditional and non-traditional security threats are mutually reinforcing each other and the combination of the two creates problems of a new kind.
III. China’s Concepts and Policies of External Relations
It must be pointed out at the outset that China shares many concepts and policies of external relations with the other members of the international society. All of us share the same concepts and ideas that we are living in the same globalized world. Unity in diversity is the feature of our time. Interdependence is the common basis of our relations to each other. Multilateralism is generally accepted as the proper framework to deal with global affairs. Global issues become the common agendas of our time. Cooperation rather than conflicts is the joint approach for us. From Europe to North America, from Asia to Latin America, we are all talking about better education, more job opportunities, higher qualities of lives, and better environments. Anyway, we are all human beings and our governments should be responsive and responsible to people’s needs and desires.
Being an important player with a long history, rich culture and the largest population, China does have the following concepts with its own distinctions and characteristics:
Peace has served as the core concept of China’s domestic and foreign policies. In its long history, peace has been deeply rooted in the Chinese culture. The main schools of traditional Chinese thinking have long advocated peace among the peoples, societies and nations while respecting the pluralism and diversities of the world. “Peaceful but not identical” has become one of China’s principles for conducting its foreign relations.
Peace is proven to be the only way of development and prosperity. In modern times, China had suffered greatly from foreign invasions and domestic divisions. In the initial years of the PRC, China worked with India and Burma to establish the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence. Ten years of the so-called Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) had offered only negative experiences. The most recent three decades of reform and open-up has been a great success possible in the context of peace and development. China has learnt these lessons through both positive and negative experiences and reached consensus of adhering to the present course of peaceful development.
Peace is the goal for China’s becoming a strong nation in the world. Some people try to quote the examples of German and Japan in the 1930s to vindicate the inevitability of conflicts between the rising power and established one. But our reading is different, since the non-peaceful rise of the two examples was a failure, why should we repeat the same mistakes. Actually, Europe has learnt a lesson from the two world wars and so has Germany and France from their perennial hostilities. They are now well advancing on the right track of union. China sees both imperatives and possibilities of improving its relations with such traditional powers like the United States, European powers and Japan in a peaceful way. This explains why China pledges its firm adherence to the road of peaceful development.
The aim for Mutual benefits and win-win reflects China’s updated concept of interests and cooperation. Chinese culture has attached great importance to virtue and morality in conducting its foreign relations. The Chinese believe that interest-based friendship will end when the interests disappear. This sharply contrasts to the pursuance of interest-maximization prevailing in some other parts of the world. In the time of globalization, the concept of zero-sum game has become obsolete and positive-sum has gained the day.
China benefits tremendously from its interaction and interchanges with the outside world in the aspects of philosophy, ideas and concepts, social structures, development models and market economy, etc. In the meantime, China has made both actual and intellectual contributions to the world. For instance, in the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and the current global financial crisis, China has not only contributed to the material solution, but has also exemplified the “we are in the same boat” spirit of interdependence to other states. Other examples include: China participates with the highest number of personnel in peacekeeping forces among the permanent members of the UN Security Council, and China also sends its fleets to counter the pirates in the Gulf of Aden.
China will continue to contribute to regional and global development through its own development, and expand areas of common interests with various sides. While securing China’s own development, China also accommodates the legitimate concerns of other countries, especially those of the developing countries. In its current drive to go global, China strives for all-win objectives in such places as Africa and Latin America.
High sense of crisis management becomes an important feature of Chinese diplomatic thinking and practices. The world today is undergoing tremendous changes and adjustments. Despite of the fact that peace and development is the main theme of our time, the world remains far from tranquil. China sees clearly all the challenges and difficulties today such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Korean and Iranian nuclear crises, territorial and maritime disputes, growing gaps between the richest and poorest nations, digital divide and terrorism.
China firmly believes that prevention is the best cure. As Confucius said more than two thousands years ago, “Preparedness ensures success, unpreparedness spells failure.” China has devoted much of its diplomatic resource to the crisis prevention both at home and abroad. It is a matter of course that crisis still happens in spite of our preventive efforts. Then China also works with other parties concerned to deal with the crises squarely. China’s effort in dealing with the North Korean Nuclear Issue is just a case in point.
China is fully aware of its limits in its foreign relations. China is still a developing country facing enormous challenges and difficulties, which limit China’s capacity, mobility and flexibility in its diplomacy. China aims for the lofty vision of a harmonious world but acts realistically in an incremental way; China calls consistently for a new international system and order but negotiates patiently in a step-by-step manner; China wishes to solve all the problems overnight but works seriously from the easy to difficult ones; and China strives for the status of a globally-recognized strong nation but rejects the notion of G-2. In short, while China adopts pro-active policies, it keeps low-profile and sets pragmatic and phased goals.
IV. New Features and Trends of China-EU Relations
China-EU relationship has been one of the most important in the world and will remain so in the future. As is pointed in the China EU Policy Paper of October 2003, there is no fundamental conflict of interest between China and the EU and neither side poses a threat to the other. But six years have since passed, there have emerged some new contexts, features and problems in this important relationship.
The three-tier structure of China-EU relations demands new frameworks of thinking and conducting these important relations.
The first tier is that China-EU relations, to a large extent, are still based on bilateral and state-to-state relations. China on the one hand and UK, Germany, France, Spain, Poland, Czech and others on the other, make up the basic counterparts and contexts of China-European relations. On the whole, these bilateral relations are more pragmatic than ideological.
The second tier is at the regional level where EU serves as the agent. Within EU and cooperation with EU, consultation and coordination face numerous difficulties. In terms of its foreign relations, the EU is approaching but not quite yet a complete entity as a player in the global affairs as well as in China-EU relations. EU has not acquired a full status as a player, but it has been participating in many ways in international affairs ranging from EU diplomatic relations to G-20; EU does not have a common foreign and security policy, but it has produced quite a number of China papers as guiding lines in directing its China policy; EU has not completed its institution building without a real “foreign minister”, yet it conducts its diplomatic interaction with China through the so-called troika mechanism and others. This explains why China-EU relations sometimes would go sour and difficult.
The third tier is the relatively new frontier of interaction at the global level. Although China and EU had worked together at the global level for some years, the breadth and depth of such work are very different now. Firstly, China and EU are now confronting the task of reforming the existing international systems and building new ones with real and practical reallocation of interests, rights and obligations that can effectively address issues such as US dollar’s status as the foreign reserve, IMF and World Bank functions, fading roles of the G-8 and rising status of the G-20, and the reform of UNSC. Secondly, China and EU are now confronted with a much wider array of issues and agendas. Economic and trade relations are important but so climate change and sustainable development. Last but not least, China and EU needs more than ever to work with other players including not only the United States but also Russia, Japan and Emerging Powers, not only state actors but also non-state actors such as Africa Union and MERCOSUR, and not only regional cooperation but also inter- and cross-regional cooperation such as ASEM.
Basically speaking, there are five kinds of problems and issues influencing the further development of the China-EU relations.
Firstly, domestic consideration acquires greater position on the agendas of China and EU. Both sides understand the importance of their mutual relationship and pledge to approach it in a strategic way. But in reality, China and EU are paying most of their attention to economic recovery and internal stability. China is now at a critical stage of economic and social development and as a consequence, is concentrating on the dual goal of economic growth and social stability. EU is trying hard to push through the Lisbon Treaty and readjust the relations among its 27 members. To EU, a common foreign and security policy is desirable but not the most urgent. Therefore, domestic factors have greater influence in deciding the mutual agendas between China and EU.
Secondly, changing co-relation of powers in the world has a profound impact on the mutual relations between China and EU. China finds itself in a new position of rights and obligations in global affairs as a result of its rapidly increasing comprehensive national strength. EU has to face its relatively weaker standing and decreasing influence. Furthermore, EU is still debating its strategic vision and searching its role in this new configuration of powers in the world. Neither China nor EU is well and sufficiently prepared for this new situation, but both need to adapt each other as well as readjust the relations with other players of the international society. As the international system and order constitutes the institutional arrangement for the reallocation of rights, interests and responsibilities on the basis of reconfiguration of powers, the effective and far-sighted meeting of these new challenges will exert a profound and long-lasting impact.
Thirdly, new situation calls for new concepts, ideas and values. China and EU differ in their statehood. EU is in a process of transiting towards a post-modern and super-national entity, which is changing the European concepts of national sovereignty and blurring the division between internal and external affairs. With its long and rich history and a territory being the size of the whole Europe, China remains a nation-state and attaches great importance to sovereignty and territorial integrity. Besides, they hold different views on the shifting of the centers of power gravities in the world. China believes that the global center of gravity is shifting from the West to the East, or at least there are several centers. Many in Europe still cling to a Euro-centric view and attempt to hold the high grounds in vision and mission. Furthermore, neither side is fully prepared for China’s rapid development. While China’s GDP is in the forefront of the world, its mentality still stays as a developing country. Europe finds itself inadequately prepared to work with a rising China on an equal footing. Finally, China’s successes of reform and open-up have provided the world an alternative model than what has been advocated by the Europeans. EU finds it difficult to accept this new reality both intellectually and practically.
Fourthly, there are structural and organizational barriers in the China-EU relations as well. Double-tier game constitutes one of the structural difficulties in the China-EU relations. While generally pursuing stable and beneficial relations bilaterally, China and EU often encounter difficulties in multilateral ways. On the one hand, it is truly difficult for 27 members to reach consensus in the absence of a common foreign and security policy. On the other hand this absence also provides good excuse for EU and its members’ resort to bargaining with and pressuring China. The perennial negotiation on China’s market economy status and lifting-up of arms embargo are two typical cases in point.
And fifthly, China and Europe have different agendas and issues to think of and deal with. Different backgrounds and conditions result in different policies and measures towards the current agendas. China firmly defends its national core interests and strongly opposes some of the European leaders’ meeting with the Dai Lai Lamar. China also disagrees with some European notions and practices of interfering in other countries’ internal affairs in the name of the so-called human rights. China and EU lack strategic trusts in each other’s policies and practices on providing assistances to some countries, such as in Africa and Latin America, and on some global issues. These differences sometimes have threatened the very existence of China-EU strategic partnership.
Both China and EU need to make greater efforts to promoting China-EU Relations to a new height.
In the new era of cooperation and competition among major power centers, both China and EU need to redefine their foci of interaction, interplay and interchange. These mainly include the following four aspects: system building, major power relations, important issues, and shared values.
Firstly, system-reforming in general and financial restructuring in particular have become new and important contents of the China-EU strategic partnership. When China and European Community established formal relations in 1975, the two sides mainly aimed at balancing the two superpowers and promoting economic relations. Even in their respective policy papers regarding each other in the early 21st Century, neither the Chinese nor the European side paid much attention to the reforming and building of the international system. While referring to their economic relations, the two sides are mostly focused on trade and investment. But now the two major players of the world are placing system building and financial reforming high on their agendas as they realize that they will become playgrounds instead of players in this new world if they do not think and act rightly. But so far the two sides lack the supports of mechanisms, institutions, concepts and intellectual backups, etc. Specifically and urgently the two sides need to work on the issues of the would-be foreign reserves, system and law/regulation building, institutional cooperation, strategic and policy cooperation, and the training of human/talents resources.
Secondly, Major power relations have acquired many new meanings in the China-EU relations of the 21st Century. Nowadays, “major powers” connote expanded spectrums that have extended to emerging powers and even resource-rich countries well beyond the group of traditional powers. Sometimes potential powers and regional powers are included as well. While contemplating on the membership of G-X, China prefers G-20 for its larger inclusiveness whereas some Europeans would like to limit the number to G-14. Additionally, in the absence of a complete entity such as the supranational government of EU, China has to deal with the member states individually. For instance, China established strategic partnerships with Britain (2004), France (2004) and Spain (2005), in addition to its strategic partnership in 2003 with EU. But these individual European powers are no longer the global players and often drift in their thinking without a clear strategic and forward-looking vision. Finally, their relations with other major powers are not smooth. China and the United States see more eye to eye on the reform of financial system than EU and the United States between themselves. The EU and BRICs differ even more greatly on the reform of global economic and political systems.
Thirdly, China and EU share many views and attitudes towards the major hotspots in the world but differ greatly in some of their bilateral issues. The former include the Iranian nuclear issue and Middle East peace process. Their difference on Darfur is narrowing. The latter are focused on the so-called human rights, Tibet and Xingjiang isuues. Some Europeans still want to reshape China according to their own model. Consequently, China and Europe have long debated on some of the important values and principles, such as non-interference in internal affairs, non-conditionality in providing assistances to some less developed countries, and the universal applicability of Western system to other countries.
Last but not least, China and EU also have difficulties in institutional docking and intellectual communication. Networking has already become an important feature of global relations. There is plenty of room for the two sides to strengthen and expand their networking at various levels and in different fields. New ways must be found for summitries and high level exchanges to become less concerned with ritualistic formalities but more with substantial exchanges. Symbolic ways must be considered in achieving landmark cooperation in economic, trade and investment. Objective ways must be sought for in each other’s media coverage and opinion leadership. Extensive and intensive ways must be explored to promote non-governmental communication and people-to-people exchanges. Regular ways must be enacted to connect think tanks and institutions of higher learning as the main channels.