Zhao Long Interviewed by South China Morning Post

Zhao Long    source：South China Morning Post

Taiwan remains a red line for Beijing, but island’s informal EU ties are prompting worries that the bloc may backslide on one-China policy.

This year marks half a century of formal diplomatic relations between China and the European Union as well as the 25th anniversary of the founding of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China. In this, the fourth part of the series, Shi Jiangtao looks at how the issue of Taiwan is overshadowing the relationship.

As mainland China and the European Union mark 50 years of diplomatic ties, there is growing concern in Beijing that the bloc may be undermining its one-China policy, as Brussels – and some individual member states in particular – expand informal diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Historically viewed as a diplomatic formality, Taiwan has gained increasing prominence in Beijing’s relations with the EU over the past decade. This has complicated Brussels’ efforts to balance between economic partnerships with Beijing, strategic alignment with Washington, and growing unofficial trade and cultural ties with Taipei.

After establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1975, all member states of the European Economic Community – the precursor to the EU – formally recognised Beijing as the sole legitimate government of China, a stance now mirrored by most of the world.

This commitment, routinely reaffirmed in subsequent high-level exchanges, has long been seen by Beijing as a major diplomatic red line.

It regards the issue as both a gauge of the EU’s adherence to the one-China policy and a litmus test of Brussels’ much-touted drive for strategic autonomy amid intensifying US-China rivalry. 

In recent years, however, several European countries have expanded ties with Taipei, seeking to actively reinterpret their one-China policy – distinguishing it from Beijing’s one-China principle, even as Brussels has stepped up efforts to “de-risk” its relationship with mainland China.

Beijing’s concerns cover multiple areas, including some EU members’ increased military presence in the Indo-Pacific, which it sees as a provocation, and a growing belief that Europe would prefer to maintain the status quo – something the mainland Chinese authorities fear could embolden pro-independence forces in Taiwan.

With ties increasingly overshadowed by tensions over Taiwan, observers have warned of growing risks of escalation, miscalculation and the possibility that European states, especially those that play a prominent role in Nato, would be drawn into any future conflict between Washington and Beijing over the self-governed island. 

According to Cui Hongjian, a former diplomat and head of EU studies at Beijing Foreign Studies University, the question of Taiwan, once largely a non-issue, has gradually become a “prominent concern”. 

“This has created a new dynamic between China and Europe on [the issue of] Taiwan,” Cui said. 

European officials, however, maintain that their engagement with Taiwan, centred largely on economic and cultural exchanges, aligns with long-standing practices and does not infringe upon their commitment to the one-China policy. 

As the EU increasingly diverges from its historical stance on Taiwan, Beijing has countered by leveraging trade incentives and emphasising landmark historical documents, such as the 1943 Cairo Declaration, the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation and UN Resolution 2758, to reinforce its position that the island is China’s internal matter. 

Cui argued that some European countries, adopting US-style strategies, had increasingly used the Taiwan issue as a “diplomatic card” to gain leverage over China and identified the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war as key catalysts.During the pandemic, Taiwan’s role as a semiconductor powerhouse, led by TSMC, and its “mask diplomacy” elevated its global visibility. 

Central and eastern European countries, particularly Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Poland – have deepened their relationship with Taipei through diplomatic visits, trade offices and parliamentary support, citing shared democratic values and economic interests. 

In contrast, countries like Hungary and Serbia – a non-EU member – maintain pro-Beijing stances, bolstered by Chinese investments under the Belt and Road Initiative and overall diplomatic alignment.

Meanwhile, major powers like Germany and France have cautiously expanded economic and security ties and unofficial cultural exchanges with Taiwan, while adhering to the one-China policy by avoiding formal recognition of the island or support for its independence, and prioritising trade with Beijing to avoid escalation.

 “Often driven by populist motives, Taiwan has become a symbol that fuses nationalism and resistance to great-power interference, elevating its profile through the ‘sympathy card’, ‘economic card’ and ‘security card’, making it a critical and increasingly visible factor in China-EU relations,” Cui said. 

From Europe’s perspective, however, Taiwan remains a secondary concern compared with its broader economic interests in mainland China.

Europe has yet to form a coherent consensus on what the Taiwan issue means for China-Europe relations or how to respond to future developments, according to Cui. 

“Europe has mirrored the US in playing the ‘Taiwan card’, though its impact remains confined mainly to diplomacy,” he said. 

 “Unlike the US, where Taiwan involves strategy, security, and military dimensions, Europe’s engagement has limits. 

“For most European countries, Taiwan continues to serve primarily as a diplomatic and economic instrument, rather than a strategic security concern.” 

Feng Zhongping, director of the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, also said Taiwan had not played as prominent a role in China–EU relations as it had in Beijing’s relations with the United States.

But the current European stance warranted caution, he added, pointing to its growing criticism of Beijing’s cross-strait approach – particularly its increased military pressure and diplomatic efforts to isolate Taipei – and its preference for maintaining the status quo. 

“This contrasts with China’s goal of seeking eventual reunification. This divergence highlights a fundamental gap in understanding: Europeans see the status quo as a stabilising force, while China views it as a risk that could embolden pro-independence elements,” he said. 

However, the European Parliament has joined the US in recent years in challenging Beijing’s interpretation of UN Resolution 2758, which gave China’s seat at the United Nations to Beijing, something it repeatedly cites to support its claims of sovereignty over Taiwan. 

During his recent visit to Europe, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Taiwan was a core national interest for China and pressed EU leaders to curtail unofficial engagements with Taipei. 

In a meeting with the bloc’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, Wang specifically cautioned against any attempts to challenge the UN resolution, which he claimed had “once and for all” settled Taiwan’s status. 

From Europe’s perspective, the Taiwan issue has already become “one of the most important factors” shaping EU-China relations, according to Frans-Paul van der Putten, a China expert based in the Netherlands.

He warned that a potential future conflict between Beijing and Washington over Taiwan – one that could draw in most EU member states as Nato allies – could not be ruled out.“This means the EU has to view its current economic relations with China in light of the possibility that it could one day face China as a military adversary. As a result, the EU’s de-risking efforts won’t remain confined to peacetime national security concerns,” van der Putten said.

Following Washington’s lead, Europe has increasingly framed the Taiwan issue within the broader Indo-Pacific strategic context, in a bid to avoid overly provoking Beijing.The EU’s 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy underscored the importance of stability in the Taiwan Strait for “European security and prosperity”, noting that 40 per cent of its external trade passed through the Indo-Pacific region, particularly the strait. 

Unlike the US, which remains Taiwan’s staunchest backer and top arms supplier, the EU has largely avoided committing to the island’s defence, focusing instead on diplomatic and economic engagement. However, France and Germany have in recent years joined other US allies such as Britain and Australia in conducting freedom-of-navigation operations in the Taiwan Strait. 

While they say these operations, modelled after similar US patrols, are designed to uphold international maritime law, Beijing deems them provocative, asserting that they challenge its sovereignty and risk destabilising the region. 

Chinese observers argued that if Beijing were to conduct similar naval deployments near European waters, such as the English Channel, it would likely provoke strong reactions from capitals like Paris and London. 

Cui said that these operations carried more symbolic than strategic and military weight, but highlighted the extent of US influence on the EU’s approach to China. 

“The way China handles the Taiwan issue amid intensifying US-China rivalry will significantly shape the stance and behaviour of certain European countries,” Cui said. 

“It is not surprising that smaller nations in Europe and beyond choose to use the Taiwan card to curry favour with the US.” 

Philippe Le Corre, a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Centre for China Analysis, said the EU’s ties with Taiwan reflected shared interests in trade and democratic values, rather than a rejection of the one-China policy. 

 “EU-China relations are tense enough, with or without the Taiwan question,” he remarked. “There are widespread concerns that a Chinese action in Taiwan would destabilise trade and security in the region. No one would gain, not even China. This is not just a European concern, but also an Asian concern.”

Le Corre also highlighted the sizeable European expatriate community in Taiwan, around 30,000 residents, adding: “If a military conflict were to take place, what would happen to these people? 

“The EU doesn’t support Taiwanese independence, but it sees no reason to close the doors to economic and cultural ties to Taiwan – all of which have been taking place for the past 40 years without China complaining whatsoever.”

Europe has repeatedly expressed concern about China’s increasingly close relations with Russia. Beijing’s efforts to address this by saying it is neutral in the war with Ukraine and does not provide arms to either side appear to have had a limited impact so far.

At this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, French President Emmanuel Macron also linked the two situations. 

Beijing has firmly rejected such comparisons, pointing out that Ukraine is a sovereign state and member of the UN unlike Taiwan, amid growing concerns about coordinated attempts by the US and several European capitals to internationalise the issue.

Feng also warned against drawing parallels between the two, saying slogans such as “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow”, prompted by Nato, failed to acknowledge Taiwan’s distinct status as a non-sovereign entity under international law.

Framed within the broader “democracy versus authoritarianism” narrative, Taiwan is often portrayed as a democratic counterpoint to mainland China, an image that resonates deeply within Europe, according to Cui. 

However, he warned that European expectations about China’s position on Ukraine have proven unrealistic, as Beijing views Russia’s future differently, limiting the potential for China-EU cooperation.

Cui echoed the need for nuanced diplomacy, calling for more targeted and differentiated policies towards individual European countries, balancing “reason with consequences through a mix of soft and hard approaches”. 

“The Taiwan issue, as a core political foundation of bilateral ties, has eroded mutual trust between China and the EU,” he said. “If Europe aligns with the US, it will further destabilise the Taiwan Strait and escalate tensions. Under mounting international pressure, China’s room to resolve the issue domestically is shrinking.” 

Cui argued that Beijing should issue stronger warnings to countries actively playing the Taiwan card, citing the example of Lithuania, which had its diplomatic relations downgraded for allowing a “Taiwanese representative office” in its capital in 2021.For larger powers such as France and Germany, China should clarify its position to prevent undue influence from smaller, more provocative states, according to Cui. 

“As Beijing continues to treat the Taiwan issue as a domestic matter, it needs to present a balanced and comprehensive Taiwan Strait policy to prevent Europe from amplifying unilateral security concerns,” he said. 

“By showcasing positive aspects like economic cooperation and cultural exchanges, and emphasising peaceful resolution and demonstrating sincerity through tangible actions, Beijing can foster greater understanding and trust within Europe.” 

Zhao Long, a senior research fellow at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies,said that from China’s perspective, the EU and its member states had limited influence over Taiwan and were unlikely to agree on a unified approach. 

But he warned that pro-Taiwan elements in Europe, driven by ideological bias and geopolitical agendas, would continue to leverage the Taiwan issue to contain Beijing. 

“Taiwan is a core interest for Beijing and a political prerequisite for sustaining healthy China-EU relations. Although not always in the spotlight, it remains highly sensitive and, if mismanaged, could become a long-term variable affecting the trajectory of bilateral ties,” he said. 

Zhao urged Beijing to continue cultivating rational voices within the EU, bolster diplomatic engagement and strengthen strategic communication.

Despite glaring differences, China and the EU share a fundamental interest in maintaining cross-strait stability, according to Van der Putten, author of China Resurrected: A Modern Geopolitical History.

“China could signal its intention not to provide military support to Russia, while the EU could state more explicitly than it has done so far that it will not support potential future Taiwanese initiatives aimed at gaining independence,” he said.