**South-South Cooperation and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): Preparing for a post-2015 setting**

**Background paper for the European Report on Development 2013 with special focus on China-Africa cooperation**

by

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**Abbreviations**

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|---|---|---|
| AfDB | - | African Development Bank |
| AU | - | African Union |
| BAPOA | - | Buenos Aires Plan of Action |
| BRICS | - | Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa [grouping] |
| DAC | - | Development Assistance Committee [of the OECD] |
| ECA | - | [United Nations] Economic Commission for Africa |
| ECOSOC | - | Economic and Social Committee [of the United Nations] |
| EU | - | European Union |
| FOCAC | - | Forum on China-Africa Cooperation |
| G7 | - | Group of 7 [Industrialised Countries] |
| GDP | - | Gross Domestic Product |
| ICT | - | Information and Communication Technology |
| IPRCC | - | International Poverty Reduction Centre China |
| LOC | - | Line of Credit |
| MDG | - | Millennium Development Goals |
| NAM | - | Non-Aligned Movement |
| NEPAD | - | New Partnership for Africa's Development |
| NIC | - | Newly Industrialised Country |
| ODA | - | Official Development Assistance |
| OECD | - | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| SCAAP | - | Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme |
| SDG | - | Sustainable Development Goals |
| SSA | - | Sub-Saharan Africa |
| SEZ | - | Special Economic Zone |
| SSC | - | South-South Cooperation |
| TCDC | - | Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries |
| UN | - | United Nations Organisation |
| UNCTAD | - | UN Conference on Trade and Development |

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## I. Introduction

In September 2000, 189 States Members of the United Nations, 147 of which were represented by their Head of State, endorsed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). With this endorsement they set themselves eight goals to be reached by 2015 (from the 1990 base). Whatever the results look like in 2015, thinking needs to be done about the time after 2015. What should be done with regard to the future international development efforts? Should the international community just continue these half-fulfilled MDGs with prolonging their timeframe for another 10 or 15 years because of the hovering global crises including global financial crisis, climate change, and various insecurity challenges? Or should we forge an entirely new post-MDG global development consensus despite of the obvious failure and desirability of MDGs? Or should we find a third way by adding some new elements into the MDGs and improving the performance of all parties in terms of the effort of pursuing the MDGs, for example, the sustainable development goals (SDGs) that proposed by Colombia and Guatemala and then partially accepted by the Rio+20 summit? In other words, we are at a crucial point for prospecting the future of international development efforts. This paper tries to explore the challenges we are facing with regard to the MDGs in the run up to and beyond 2015. Our specific focus is on the role of Southern partners (here: mostly China) in achieving the MDGs in Africa.

During the past one decade or so, the economic balance of the world has changed a lot and this comes with great pressures for global development efforts. Even though some of the MDGs recorded progress, the prospects of fulfilling MDGs in all regions of the globe are not bright, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) where the rate and pace appear to lag behind other regions (United Nations 2007, 2011).[1] The first decade witnessed global power shifts, both from the sovereign state to non-state actors and from the West to 'the Rest' (Nye 2011). The latter came with at least two major changes.

First, the current global financial crisis, with numerous sub-crises like the US sub-prime crisis and European debt crisis, create doubts about the survival of a strict neo-liberalism, which has been at the heart of many prescriptions of traditional development partners towards the developing world. Consequently, we witness new practices and thinking about 'how to do development' that are beyond the neo-liberal consensus and do, for instance include a key role of state-owned enterprises and pro-active state activities (incentives and regulation) for development. The fact that the international development effort since the 1960s has not produced many of its declared goals for development and thus many actors from emerging countries regard Western development cooperation more as a failure than success call for rethinking of the current dominant theory and approach of development; a line commonly heard during numerous conferences.

Secondly, with the rising of emerging powers, some alternatives are emerging, particularly in the field of international development aid. Emerging countries provide new instruments and thinking of cooperation through the growing eminent South–South cooperation (SSC). The rise of the emerging 'donors' or development partners may be seen as the mirror image of a new, re-balancing global governance system in which rising powers like Brazil, China, and India are entering the world stage as influential actors (Schlager 2007, p. 2; Grimm et al. 2009).

These above developments are of great relevance for the forging of a post-MDG global development consensus due to their potential to contribute new practices and ideas to the rethinking of the dominant development approach that has been dominated by western experience and theory for more than half a century.

Whatever global development goal the international community chooses for the post-MDG era, it cannot afford to ignore the significant rising of the emerging powers, notably Brazil, China, India, South Africa, as well as other growing developing economies such as Indonesia, Turkey or Mexico., and its impacts on the realization of MDGs, especially in SSA. One of the key features of years since 2000 has been the rising

[1] Africa, however, had the greatest challenge in meeting the MDGs, as its starting point was particularly low and relative targets such as halving poverty meant a tremendously higher effort than in more affluent regions.

importance and the intensification of South-South economic relationships. Entering into the 21st century, various characterizations of the emerging countries have been formulated by business analysts, including Goldman Sachs' identification of the BRICs and the 'Next 11' (Sachs 2007)[2] and PriceWaterhouseCoopers' identification of the E7 (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, , Russia, Mexico and Turkey) (Wozniak 2006).

Goldman Sachs highlighted the so-called BRICs economies – Brazil, Russia, India and China – with 40% of the world's population spread out over three continents, which already accounted for 25% of global gross domestic product (GDP) at the time of their analysis (2001). Goldman Sachs reckons that these four emerging economies could collectively surpass the output of the Group of Seven (G7) wealthy nations by 2032, with China becoming the world's largest economy before 2030 (Beattie 2010). In terms of official development assistance (ODA), the countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) continue to be the source of most international development assistance – US$121.5 billion in 2008. But the share of non-DAC contributors has been rising, especially from middle-income developing countries such as China and India (Grimm et al. 2009b; African Economic Outlook 2011).

The economic and political rise of emerging powers contribute greatly to the thus far steeply increasing SSC and make the latter a dynamic field for practitioners and academics. The term SSC is understood to mean 'a broad framework for collaboration among countries of the South, in the political, economic, social, environmental and technical domains' (UNDP 2006). UNCTAD refers to SSC as 'processes, institutions and arrangements designed to promote political, economic and technical cooperation among developing countries in pursuit of common development goals' (UNCTAD 2010). Specifically, the High Level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation held in Nairobi in 2009 notes that 'South-South Cooperation is a common endeavour of people and countries of the South, born out of shared experiences and sympathies, based on their common objectives and solidarity, and guided by, inter alia, the principles of respect for national sovereignty and ownership'. It covers a range of activities, including trade, investment, finance, technology, sharing of knowledge, experiences, policies and best practices (United Nations 2010).

Despite more recent attention and steeply increasing activities more recently, SSC has a long history. In the 1950s, SSC emerged in the context of the common struggle of former colonies to attain genuine independence and development. The Bandung conference in 1955 brought together 29 countries from Asia and Africa to promote economic and cultural cooperation in the Asian-African region 'on the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty'. This pioneering South-South conference paved the way for the rise of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 and the Group of 77 in 1964 (Final Communiqué of the Asian-African conference of Bandung 1955). However, there was no strategic framework for technical cooperation among developing countries until 1978 when the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPOA) was adopted at the United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC) in August 1978 in Buenos Aires. As a consequence, until the 1980s, SSC focused mostly on political issues, with some smaller-scale people-to-people cooperation, e.g. in the health sector (medical teams) (LI Anshan 2011). However, from the 1980s and especially at the turn of the 21st century, SSC moved towards exchanges in economic issues (Grimm 2011; Cissé 2011).

Africa has been an active participant and a core region for SSC. There are a number of reasons for this development. First, SSC is means for the continent to increase its bargaining power in global affairs, such as arguments in the 1970s for a New International Economic Order. Second, it is a mechanism for Africa to tackle and overcome its developmental challenges, diversifying away from one or two key trade partners only. Third, it increases and diversifies the sources of development finance for the continent. Fourth, it is regarded as a key tool to promote and strengthen solidarity among African countries and between the continent and its Southern partners (United Nations Conference Centre 2011). Through relationships and partnerships, African countries and counterparts in other developing regions have engaged on the basis of solidarity and collaboration.

[2] Goldman Sachs' understanding of the grouping in their analysis is not identical to the subsequent political formation of the BRICS, which includes South Africa since April 2011.

In this discussion, South Africa holds a particular position. The country is, like other emerging economies, both a recipient and a donor of development cooperation. South Africa is, however, in a special position as a somewhat diversified industrial economy (with substantial social and structural shortcomings, admittedly) on the African continent with its high numbers of Least Developed Countries. Previously, development cooperation was used by South Africa as a tool to 'buy off' some governments in an otherwise hostile region that supported the anti-Apartheid movement. Since the end of the Apartheid regime, cooperation discourses in South Africa are in the SSC context, which is symbolically stated by renaming the Department for Foreign Affairs as the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and by plans to establish a development agency under the name of South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA). The latter reports little progress since the decision to establish the agency in 2007. Yet, South Africa is giving strong political backing to regional organisations such as the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and is providing bilateral funding to African states, including Rwanda (Grimm 2011c; Braude et al. 2008).

Initially, Africa's relations with countries now known as the global South[3] focused on political issues - largely in the struggle against colonial rule. China and Cuba have to be mentioned in this context, as well as the Non-Aligned Movement more broadly. These partnerships were predicated on the principles of equality, mutual respect of sovereignty and solidarity. However, at the turn of the 21st century, economic considerations have become the main motif of cooperation of countries in the developing world with Africa. Especially from 2000, Africa forged new partnerships with countries of the global South, driven mainly by economic considerations, with regional economic communities and the African Union and its NEPAD programme as a key point of political reference, and personalities such as the presidents of Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, and Algeria pushing for a (moderately) pan-African agenda. This changed focus is due to, among other things, the changing nature of the international political economy as some countries in the global South have become global economic power, especially Brazil, China and India. Other countries in the South have achieved the status of newly industrialised countries (NICs) or – as in the case of South Korea, for instance – have joined the rank of high-income economies. These have increased the influence of the global South and consequently the SSC in the world political economy. South Africa is counted into the group of emerging economies – not least since its accession into the BRICS grouping – while some also describe it as dual economy (e.g. former President Thabo Mbeki), with features of an industrialised world and a developing country, i.e. a large part of the population living in poverty and very limited access to public services.

SSC has been receiving greater attention lately, particularly as financial volumes and political impetus have increased, not least because developing countries gain increasing weight in the world economy. While there is a range of cooperation dimensions and practices, the SSC literature almost exclusively focuses on the economic dimension, and more specifically on development aid. There is a growing body of reviews by various international organizations, like the UNDP, the OECD, the African Union (AU), the African Development Bank (AfDB), etc. For example, the 2005 United National Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report *South-South Cooperation in International Investment Arrangements* explores the implications of SSC to international investment structure. Similarly, a background paper of the Development Cooperation Forum of 2008 was exploring data and trends (ECOSOC 2006). In May 2011, AU, Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) of UN, and AfDB jointly issued their research on "Harnessing South-South Cooperation for Financing Development in Africa" states that,

> The inter-connections between South-South Cooperation, Capacity Development and Aid Effectiveness constitute the central pillar of Development Effectiveness. This relates to promoting sustainable positive change and results. Development Effectiveness in the African context is framed within the broader framework of the continent's political economy

[3] According to the *Human Development Report 2005*, the Global North refers to the 57 countries with high human development that have a Human Development Index above .8, most of them are located in the Northern Hemisphere; accordingly, the Global South refers to the countries of the rest of the world, most of which are located in the Southern Hemisphere (*UNDP Report 2005*, p. 363).

> providing the foreground for the discussion of harnessing SSC in financing development in Africa. (AU & ECA & AfDB 2011, p. 1)

UNCTAD's *The Least Developed Countries Report 2011*: *The Potential Role of South-South Cooperation for Inclusive and Sustainable Development* argues that,

> South-South cooperation has features which make it more likely to support and encourage such State–building than the traditional forms of development cooperation currently do. It is thus possible to create a positive interaction between building developmental States in LDCs and South-South cooperation. (UNCTAD 2011, p. 86)
>
> Guided by the spirit of solidarity with least developed countries, developing countries, consistent with their capabilities, will provide support for the effective implementation of the programme of action in mutually agreed areas of cooperation within the framework of South–South cooperation, which is a complement to, but not a substitute for, North-South cooperation. (UNCTAD 2011, p. 110)

The phrasing of South–South cooperation being 'a valuable complement to North-South cooperation' can also be found in the Accra Agenda for Action (Art. 19e) and in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation of 2011 (Art. 5); it emphasises the non-competitive character of SSC. Meanwhile, there is a growing literature on 'emerging donors' and their relations with traditional ones. Besides different categorisations of these non-DAC partners, there are also commonalities (Grimm et al. 2009a, 2009b, Kragelund 2010). Rowlands (2008) rightly points out that emerging development actors emphasize partnership and SSC, and seem reluctant to be seen as reproducing traditional donor – recipient hierarchies. Although not sure about their future and influence, White (2011) argues that rising of 'emerging donors' will inevitably enhance these actors' regional leadership and expertise in assistance delivery and subsequently will affect the US (and, most likely, also the European) approach. Based on an overall balanced review, Ngaire Woods (2008) concludes, with the emerging of new actors, the current international assistance system is undergoing a "silent revolution".

China has become the main focus of both political discussion and empirical research on the impacts of emerging development actors on the existing aid architecture. Humphrey and Messner (2009) note that China's rise could challenge the priorities and agenda-setting success of the industrialized countries, and undermine the credibility of their advice and prescriptions. Brautigam (2009, 2010), Davies (2007) and Taylor (2009) all provide overviews of China's African aid programme and outline the general concerns of traditional donors, particularly the issues of governance and corruption, debt sustainability, and aid effectiveness. In an article focusing on China and the international aid architecture, de Haan and Warmerdam (2011) note concerns about competition between China's development ideas (called by some the 'Beijing Consensus') and the Washington Consensus. Other institutions, such as the Centre for Chinese Studies explore aspects of the China–Africa relations, covering political, economic and environmental concerns.[4]

It is important to note that the term SSC encompasses much more than foreign aid or economic cooperation (UNECOSOC 2009). Aspects of SSC range from economic integration, the formation of negotiating blocs within multilateral institutions, and military alliances to cultural exchanges. The use of the term has included humanitarian assistance and technical cooperation as well as the provision of concessional financing for development projects, programmes, budget support and strengthening the balance of payments. Cooperative relationships have been at the level of governments and their agencies as well as between private enterprises or civil society organisations. This range of efforts has made important contributions to strengthening the conditions for social and economic development in the cooperating countries. Bearing this point in mind is relevant to our exploration of the post-MDG global development consensus. Within the SSC framework, emerging powers have contributed substantially to the realization of

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[4] See <http://www.sun.ac.za/ccs> for publications on e.g. Chinese investment in Africa's infrastructure, Chinese aid transparency, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and others. Publications include discussion papers, research reports and policy briefings.

the MDGs, especially in SSA, and can be expected to contribute to the building of new global development consensus and its implementation.

The rest of this background paper will be structured in three main parts. The next section will review the contributions of SSC to working towards achieving the MDGs in Africa, focusing on the emerging powers plus two case studies (Rwanda and, to a lesser degree, Côte d'Ivoire), from which we try to identify new trends and draw implications for the future development of global development efforts. The following section will concentrate on what the post-MDG global development goal could look like and on the policy relevance for Africa, the EU, and emerging powers. The conclusion will summarise our findings about the SSC and MDGs and expectations for forging future global development goals.

**II. Contribution of SSC to the MDGs**

The political aspirations and expectations to SSC are easily formulated. Owing to shared historical experiences of foreign domination, shared development challenges, and shared experience as recipients of aid, SSC was expected to produce greater, more equal and effective cooperation. This cooperation, it was hoped, would lead to transferred knowledge, ideas, experience and development models that would result in better development outcomes and reduced poverty in the countries of the global South and avoid the unbalanced relationships experienced in North–South cooperation.

We find some good evidence on the contribution of SSC to development and to attaining the MDGs in Africa, some direct, some indirect. An indirect effect of emerging economies on progress towards the MDGs is related to their demand for commodities that are major national income earners for a number of African countries (Kaplinsky et al. 2009, Grimm 2011) and the calls for strengthening support for African MDGs by the emerging powers in multilateral occasions. Indeed, since the beginning of the 21st century, South–South trade has become one of the most dynamic components of international trade, which rises in both absolute and relative terms with accounted for 16.4% of the US$14 trillion in total world exports in 2007, up from 11.5% in 2000 (UN & LDC & IV & OHRLLS 2011, p. 9). Meanwhile, with the rising outward FDI flows from emerging South countries (Brazil, China, India and others), recent growth in South-South FDI is significant and encouraging. Annual South-South FDI flows have increased greatly from around US$ 12 billion in 1990, peaking at US$ 187 USD in 2008 (UN & LDC & IV & OHRLLS 2011, p. 27). In terms of development cooperation, according to a recent DAC estimate, total net development assistance flows from non-DAC providers lay between US$ 12 and 14 billion in 2008 (Development Cooperation Forum 2010), being at about 10% – 12% that of the OECD member states. However, according to one report by the UN Secretary General, South-South development cooperation rose sharply to US$16.2 billion in 2008, representing 63% growth compared to 2006 (Development Cooperation Forum 2010). While the global financial crisis interrupted this trend for a while, SSC revived since end of 2009 and early 2010. For example, dropped 15% with US$ 91 bill in 2009, trade volume between China and Africa rose to US$127 billion in 2010 and US$ 163 billion in 2011. Meantime, the Chinese government delivered on its commitment of providing US$10 billion of lending of a preferential nature to Africa and supported Chinese financial institutions in increasing commercial loans to Africa (Wen 2012).

Within this broader trend, emerging powers' cooperation with Africa within the MDG framework provides the essential of SSC. How to share experiences and lessons learned in efficient and effective development is of crucial importance to the economies of the countries of the South in their quest for economic and social advancement, which includes the achievement of the MDGs.

**1. African MDGs and International Support**

The MDGs represent the world's consensual commitment to deal with global poverty in its many dimensions. As the region with the most severe poverty, Africa is the focus of endeavours to achieve the MDGs. The African continent, however, only has limited financial and other resources, which calls for international support.

By focusing attention on a core set of interrelated goals and measurable targets, the MDGs provide a departure from past approaches to addressing poverty. The inherent linkages among them means that progress in one goal supports progress in others. Perhaps one of the most important linkages across the MDGs is that gender equality and women's empowerment have large multiplier effects on other MDGs. Meanwhile, achieving the education targets contributes to reductions in poverty and child mortality, which implies that education also underpins the entire set of MDGs. Eliminating major diseases improves child and maternal health, while also contributing to higher productivity. Environmental sustainability is needed both to achieve the MDGs and sustain development gains. Investing in techniques that enhance agricultural productivity reduces hunger and this, in turn, improves the health and education status of households. Promoting employment-intensive growth has a positive impact on many of the MDGs (UNDP 2010, pp. 1-2).

Such interlinkages, however, give rise to confusion and at times even contradictions. Most importantly, Kanbur argues that the MDGs address the symptoms of poverty and underdevelopment, but mostly ignore the deeper causes. In other words, why have these particular goals and targets been chosen over others? The answer to this question also has implications for how the different goals and targets are prioritised, since difficult allocative decisions will have to be made (2004). Below the level of the eight goals, the MDGs are broken down into 18 targets in total – those for which data are most easily compiled. But the result might also be that the fixation on the MDGs diverts attention from the mechanisms that produce underdevelopment (Schutter 2010). Thus, a modified or alternative programme is needed to address the social and environmental failings of the current model of economic development. Besides the scepticism about the philosophical assumptions behind the MDGs, there are many critics of their logics, means, and specific goals. For example, for some people, tensions, if not contraditions, exist between different goals, for example economic growth and sustainable development, or the type of economic growth and levels of poverty (Sodre 2010). For some others, achieving the MDGs requires fundamental reforms in the international financial architecture (Khor 2010).

In the context of this background paper, the most relevant questions are related to the global partnership (Goal 8). In 2000, global leaders made a historic commitment in the Millennium Declaration to meet their "collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level. As leaders we have a duty therefore to all the world's people, especially the most vulnerable". However, as Su-ming Khoo argues,

> The global partnership targets lack precision and stand in sharp contrast with the strict, time-bound conditionalities imposed on indebted countries. The first global partnership target simply re-states development in terms of the World Trade Organization's free trade project [...] The second target […] emphasis is placed on tariff and quota-free access for exports, in line with the free trade objective. The target also endorses enhanced debt relief (including cancellation of bilateral debt) and more generous official development assistance […].The fourth target is to 'make debt sustainable in the long term'. Why are there two targets on debt? Cynics might see this as an attempt to confuse debt relief with debt sustainability. Might debt cancellation be used to sustain indebtedness instead of freeing resources to be put towards human development? The third target under Goal 8 is to address the special concerns of landlocked and small, island developing states. We should bear in mind that these small economies are most vulnerable to negative impacts from an enhanced free trade regime. (Khoo 2005, pp. 46-48)

While MDG 8 highlights the need for international support in terms of realization of the other MDGs, it 'is not actually an end, but a means for achieving the other goals' and does not come with specific, time-bound targets (Khoo 2005, p. 46). Although there have been unprecedented commitments made and partnerships reaffirmed to realise the MDGs, there is little prospect of achieving the Goals (Report of the Secretary-General 2010). With their increasing economic and political weight, the emerging powers join into this collective effort of supporting the realization of MDGs, especially in SSA.

At a rhetorical level, the MDGs have not been very relevant in SSC; hardly any reference to the MDGs was made in key documents and speeches, The FOCAC action plan of 2009, for example, is without mention of the MDGs; reference points here are rather NEPAD and other documents. This has changed to some extent in the relationship between emerging powers and Africa over the last few years; China's Foreign Aid policy paper of April 2011, for instance, mentions the MDGs in its introduction as one of the reference points for Chinese aid.

It's important to note that there are more policy continuities than changes. Take China as example, since 2000, China has been gradually increasing its foreign aid, particularly to boost assistance to the least-developed countries. President Hu Jintao declared that China will further expand the scale of assistance to the heavily indebted poor countries and least-developed countries at the UN High-Level dialogue on Financing for Development in September 2005.In December 2003, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao announced duty-free market access for some of the commodities from the least-developed countries in Africa that have diplomatic relations with China (China's Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals 2008 Report, pp. 69-70).

While more continuities, it's interesting to point out reasons why such a policy existed. First of all, most emerging powers have their own task for implementing the MDGs because they are still developing countries. For example, while great progress achieved, China confessed that there were still huge real and potential gaps in between the reality and the MDGs in both 2008 and 2010 reports (China's Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals 2008, 2010 Reports). However, with great progress domestically, emerging powers gradually attach more importance to the MDG Goal 8, that is global partnership. Secondly, MDG also contributed to emerging powers policy coordination improvement. Take China, before 2006 the implementation of MDGs, especially the Goal 8 was parallel to the development of Sino-Africa relations. Only after 2006, these two policy areas geared into and the policy coordination has been improved since that. Some similar developments happened in other emerging powers. Thirdly, MDG helped emerging power to improve their development aid disbursement performance. As developing countries, emerging powers are not duty bound to carry out the obligations under Goal 8, however, almost all emerging powers always regard strengthening cooperation with other developing countries as an important cornerstone of foreign policy and practiced development assistance providing much earlier than their recent rising. As noted above, the earlier stage of providing assistance put the focus on economic exchanges, but now the trend is the MDGs getting priority continuously.

To forge a post-MDG global development consensus, it first is important to review the emerging powers' support to Africa to date. In the following, the contributions from China and other emerging economies are organised under the relevant MDG. While this overview cannot claim causal linkages of progress in one or the other goal due to Chinese or other contributions, it illustrates the input that China and other countries are contributing to achieving the MDGs.

The focus in our discussion is on bilateral cooperation; we will therefore not consider contributions by the private sector or individual philanthropists. This emphasis seems to be important, given that public (media) debates on Chinese engagement in Africa often confound state actors, enterprises and individual citizens. All these actors can have positive and detrimental effects on the achievement of the MDGs in both a direct and an indirect way (Kaplinsky et al. 2010; Grimm 2011). The emphasis here is on policies formulated and encouraged by the Chinese government, often in conjunction with its African counterparts, i.e. on immediate interactions.

The fact that the creation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 parallels to the launching of the MDGs facilitates the task to review China's support for African MDGs; the agendas, however, were mostly parallel initially, i.e. not building on one another, as mentioned above. Most Chinese commitments for Africa's development have been made within the framework of the FOCAC, which is consequently in focus of the following.[5]

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[5] On FOCAC, see Ian Taylor, "The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation", 2011, and a number of publications by the Centre for Chinese Studies (CCS), Stellenbosch University, assessing the process and its implementation. Notable are a report on the implementation of FOCAC, published in early 2010, and three policy briefings published before the FOCAC V meeting in May 2012 (http://www.sun.ac.za/ccs).

## 2. Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger (Goal 1)

Poverty eradication is the core aim of MDGs. The emerging economies have a fresh collective memory of poverty and substantial parts of their societies still face that problem. Thus, the emerging powers' support for poverty eradication can be regarded as clearly consensual even before the creation of MDGs. China's success in reducing poverty is one of the most important examples.

Based on previous cooperation in the areas of agriculture and food security, China proposed some ambitious plans for helping African efforts to end poverty and hunger. For example, the 2006 FOCAC Beijing Summit and the 3rd Ministerial Conference proposed to: 'send 100 senior experts on agricultural technologies to Africa and set up in Africa 10 demonstration centres of agricultural technology with special features' and other measures to strengthen cooperation with African countries. (FOCAC 2006a) By the end of 2009, the Chinese government declared that most of the proposals had been implemented:

> Following the Beijing Summit, China signed bilateral agricultural cooperation agreements with ten plus African countries, sent 104 senior agricultural experts to 33 African countries including Morocco, Guinea, Mali, the Central African Republic and Uganda, and started the construction of all 10 agricultural technology demonstration centers, making vigorous efforts to help African countries develop their agriculture.
>
> China continued to strengthen cooperation with African countries under the framework of the Special Programme for Food Security (SPFS) of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) through sending a total of 665 experts to 7 countries to provide technical guidance and train technical personnel (FOCAC 2009a).

In 2009, at the 4th FOCAC Ministerial Conference, the Chinese government once again emphasised its determination to support Africa in this regard by stating that "the two sides decided to prioritize agriculture and food security in their cooperation" (FOCAC 2009b). Such a resolution was expressed once again at the 5th FOCAC Ministerial Conference in July 2012 (FOCAC 2012b).

By the end of 2009, China had provided assistance for 221 agricultural projects in other developing countries: 35 farms, 47 agro-technology experimental and promotion stations, 11 animal husbandry projects, 15 fisheries projects, 47 farmland irrigation and water-conservancy projects, and 66 other types of agricultural project, mainly in Africa (*China's Foreign Aid [White Paper]* 2011). At the UN High-Level Meeting on the MDGs in 2010, China pledged to establish 30 demonstration centres for agricultural technologies in other developing countries, dispatch 3,000 agricultural experts and technicians, and invite 5,000 agricultural personnel from these countries to China for training. Most of these programmes were planned in Africa (*China's Foreign Aid [White Paper]* 2011).

Besides direct assistance, China also shares its experience of poverty reduction with Africa through the International Poverty Reduction Center in China (IPRCC), created by the Chinese government, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other international organizations in December 2004. The IPRCC is designed to provide a platform for knowledge sharing, information exchange and international collaboration in the areas of poverty reduction and development (IPRCC). Since its inception, IPRCC has organized a series of workshops and training courses to promote the knowledge sharing between China and Africa, especially addressing the strong interest of African governments in China's experience in developing special economic zones (SEZs) (Cissé 2011). Similarly, African governments turn to China in order to address knowledge gaps with respect to infrastructure development, particularly rural infrastructure (IPRCC 2012).

Other emerging powers participate in this effort. For example, Brazil launched the Africa–Brazil Agriculture Innovative Marketplace during the Brazil–Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Fighting Hunger and Rural Development held on 10 – 12 May 2010. This initiative aims to benefit smallholder producers by enabling innovation through collaborative partnerships between Africa and Brazil. It brings together African and Brazilian researchers to work jointly on projects to enhance Africa's agriculture innovation, including rehabilitation of pastures, natural resources management, and the production of renewable energy. It will promote knowledge exchange between Africa and Brazil as well as investments in agricultural research and development (*Africa Economic Brief* 2011a, John de Sousa 2010).

### 3. Universal Education (Goal 2)

Human resources development is the key to realization of other MDGs; universal education (Goal 2) is thus the basis for other goals. Such a fact attracts all emerging powers' attention.

China attaches great importance to development of human resources in general, and in Africa in particular. At the 2006 FOCAC Beijing Summit, President Hu Jintao declared that China will,

> Over the next three years, train 15,000 African professionals; send 100 senior agricultural experts to Africa; dispatch 300 youth volunteers to Africa; build 100 rural schools in Africa; and increase the number of Chinese government scholarships to African students from the current 2000 per year to 4000 per year by 2009. (FOCAC 2006b)

The Beijing Action Plan of 2006 also states that "the Chinese Government will continue to provide specific training of professionals and management personnel for African countries in response to their needs and will improve the follow-up monitoring mechanism to ensure the effectiveness of training". The Chinese Government pledged to:

> – Help African countries set up 100 rural schools in the next three years;
>
> – Increase the number of Chinese government scholarships to African students from 2,000 per year to 4,000 per year by 2009;
>
> – Provide annual training for a number of educational officials as well as heads and leading teachers of universities, primary, secondary and vocational schools in Africa (FOCAC 2006a).

Three years later, China added commitments in this area and declared at the 4th FOCAC meeting that, the Chinese Government offered to:

> – Help African countries to build 50 China-Africa friendship schools in the next three years.
>
> – Propose implementation of the 20+20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and African Institutions of Higher Education to establish a new type of one-to-one inter-institutional cooperation model between 20 Chinese universities (or vocational colleges) and 20 African universities (or vocational colleges).
>
> – Admit 200 middle and high level African administrative personnel to MPA programmes in China in the next three years.
>
> – Continue to raise the number of Chinese governmental scholarships and increase the number of scholarships offered to Africa to 5,500 by 2012.
>
> – Intensify efforts to train teachers for primary, secondary and vocational schools in Africa, and help African countries train 1,500 school headmasters and teachers over the next three years (FOCAC 2009b).

All these measures have been conducted, and the Chinese government pledged to continue them and promised to 'provide US$2 million annually under the framework of the UNESCO trust fund to support education development programs in Africa, in particular higher education in Africa'(FOCAC 2012b).

Beyond this immediate engagement with African education, the Chinese government also pledged to establish Confucius Institutes in African countries to teach Chinese. This pledge of FOCAC III is aimed at facilitating learning in China and comes together with encouragement to teach African languages in relevant Chinese universities and colleges. In FOCAC IV, the Chinese side committed to continuing to promote the development of Confucius Institutes, increase the number of scholarships offered to Chinese language teachers to help them study in China, and redouble efforts to raise capacity of local African teachers to teach the Chinese language (FOCAC 2009a).

As an important emerging power, Brazil's development cooperation in Africa is concentrated on the long-term development of human resources, and not mainly on investment in the physical infrastructure it needs to optimize resource extraction (Schlager 2007, p. 9; John de Sousa 2010). Brazil's development cooperation project in the field of education has been implemented mainly with PALOP (i.e. lusophone) countries involving school capacity building and fighting illiteracy. A Centre for Training and Enterprise Development was established in Luanda, Angola in 1999. Another project is the Bolsa Escola (School Grant) granted to families keeping their children in school which has been implemented in Portuguese-speaking countries such as Mozambique.

India also places an emphasis on human resources and education. In 2009, the AU and Indian government inaugurated the Pan-African e-Network Project, which aims to link major universities and centres of excellence in Africa and India and thereby extend higher education to some 10,000 students in Africa over a five-year period. It also aims to link major African hospitals to 12 super-specialty hospitals in India to improve medical training, on-line medical consultations, and other facilities. In addition to tele-education and telemedicine, the project supports e-governance, infotainment, resource-mapping and meteorological services. India undertook to provide seamless and integrated satellite, fibre-optic and wireless network, to connect 53 learning centres, 53 remote hospitals, five regional universities, and five regional hospitals in Africa to seven leading universities in India and 12 super-specialty hospitals. The Indian government has invested US$ 1 billion in the project, which is considered an example of South–South partnership and the largest distance-learning and tele-medicine project ever undertaken in Africa. A total of 47 African countries have already joined the project, which is now in its second phase, with plans to extend to all 53 AU member states (*Africa Economic Brief* 2011b; Grimm et al. 2009a).

## 4. Gender Equality and Health Care (Goals 3, 4, and 5)

China recognizes the importance of promoting gender equality and the status of women, and resolves to strengthen exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and African women in multiple forms, such as seminars and technical training. There are growing exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and African women's organizations with frequent exchange of visits by women's delegations. The All China Women's Federation (ACWF) has established five women's training and exchange centres in Djibouti, Lesotho, Mauritius, Sudan, and Zimbabwe and provided 28 batches of material assistance to women's organizations of 14 African countries. The FOCAC Women's Forum sponsored by ACWF and the Egyptian National Council for Women was held in October 2009 in Cairo. Women representatives from 28 African countries attended and released the FOCAC Women's Forum Declaration 2009 as a new milestone in China–Africa women's cooperation (FOCAC 2009a).

With regard to health, China has been sending medical teams to various African countries since the early 1960s (Zhang 2010; LI Anshan 2011). With the inauguration of both MDGs and FOCAC, China has strengthened this effort. Currently, China has medical teams in 41 African countries across 22 provinces, with nearly 2,000 doctors. The most favoured countries are – in order of their size - Morocco, Algeria, Botswana, Tanzania, Niger, Sudan, Mali, Madagascar and Burundi (Zhang 2010). The African countries concerned pledged to provide proper working and living conditions for the medical teams (Grimm et al. 2011). For the case of medical cooperation with Rwanda, please see the annex on the case study.

Within the FOCAC framework, the Chinese Government has adopted additional measures to provide timely assistance to African countries in the prevention and treatment of malaria, HIV and AIDS, avian influenza, etc. To strengthen bilateral cooperation, Chinese government decided at the 2006 FOCAC Beijing Summit to,

> --Assist African countries in building 30 hospitals and provide RMB300 million of grants for providing anti-malaria drugs to African countries and building 30 demonstration centers for prevention and treatment of malaria in the next three years;

> --Continue to send and send new and additional medical teams to Africa in the next three years on the basis of China's own capacity and the need of African countries and actively explore with African countries new ways of providing such service;
>
> --Continue to provide medicines and medical supplies needed by African countries and help them establish and improve medical facilities and train medical workers. (FOCAC 2006a)

Based on the good performance by the end of 2009 (Centre for Chinese Studies 2010), the Chinese government offered further measures at the 4th FOCAC meeting:

> —Provide RMB500 million yuan worth of medical equipment and malaria-fighting materials to 30 hospitals and 30 malaria prevention and treatment centers built by China for Africa in the coming three years. China will invite African professionals working in malaria prevention and treatment centers to training programs in China in an effort to ensure sustainable development of the project.
>
> —Continue to help relevant African countries train a total of 3,000 doctors, nurses and administrative personnel over the next three years.
>
> —Continue to do a good job in sending medical teams to Africa. (FOCAC 2009b)

Compared to China, the so-called "health diplomacy" of other emerging powers is more modest. For example, to date Brazil has given US$21 million in aid toward construction of Africa's first public factory for anti-retroviral (ARV) medication in Maputo to help Mozambique's efforts to combat AIDS. President Lula took a major part in initiating the project and returned for the factory's inauguration in January 2011 (*Africa Economic Brief* 2011a). India is quite strong in medical techniques (specifically the production of generica) and attributes importance to exports of diversified pharmacies and equipment. The Indian engagement in this sector, however, is rather commercial and thus not in our focus here.

**5. Environmentally sustainable development (Goals 6 & 7)**

With the securitization of the global climate change issue, climate change has moved to the top of the agenda of emerging powers' cooperation with Africa. China and African regional organisations as well as most African states fully recognized the importance of environmental protection for achieving sustainable development and had already included this aspect in the first FOCAC declaration of 2000. The two sides resolved to promote dialogue and exchanges in environmental protection and cooperation in human resources development based on the 2005 Conference on China-Africa Cooperation in Environmental Protection. The 2006 Beijing Action Plan declared that "in the next three years, China will increase year after year the number of environmental protection administrators and experts from Africa to receive training in China. The two sides will work with the UNEP for multilateral cooperation in environmental protection", "the two sides agreed to step up cooperation in capacity building, prevention and control of water pollution and desertification, maintenance of bio-diversity and the development of environmental protection industry and demonstration projects" (FOCAC 2006a). While there are numerous areas of joint interests, the targets in China-Africa cooperation in environmental protection were initially not quantified (Burgess & Esterhuyse 2012).[6]

Much clearer than in 2006, China and Africa delivered a comprehensive cooperation plan at the 4th FOCAC meeting in 2009. China committed

[6] Please also see the conclusions of a CCS workshop on 'Greening China and her relations with Africa'. The workshop was held in Stellenbosch, 17/18 May 2012 and brought together Chinese and African researchers; it was financed by the FOCAC programme of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was thus part of the financial commitments through FOCAC. The conclusion is available on the CCS website (www.sun.ac.za/ccs).

> To help African countries adapt to climate change and strengthen environmental protection, China will step up human resources training for African countries and expand bilateral exchanges and cooperation in the above-mentioned fields.
>
> The two sides proposed the establishment of a China-Africa partnership in addressing climate change and the holding of senior officials consultations on a non-regular basis. The Chinese Government offered to assist African countries with 100 small-sized well digging projects for water supply and clean energy projects of biogas, solar energy and small hydro-power plants in the next three years.
>
> China is ready to advance cooperation with African countries in environment surveillance, continue to share with African countries data from the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite and promote the application of the data in land use, weather monitoring and environmental protection in Africa.
>
> China will help African countries better protect the ecosystem and biodiversity and improve the comprehensive treatment of desertified areas and the relevant surveillance capacity. (FOCAC 2009b)

Environmental challenges include common global challenges such as climate change, but are also discussed as immediate bilateral issues, e.g. in the context of environmental standards in China–Africa cooperation. There are recurrent concerns about environmental pollution by individual investment projects, which are related to implementation of national legislation and the regulation of foreign enterprises in African state.[7] The standards with regard to environmental impact assessments have been improved on the Chinese side within the guidelines of China EXIM Bank for credit lines for foreign investments. (Grimm 2012a, pp. 4-11; Bosshard 2008).[8]

To achieve the goal of sustainable development – which is a challenge to all actors – technical transfer and cooperation is a key instrument in China-Africa cooperation. Accordingly, the 4th FOCAC meeting Action Plan stated that,

> The two sides agreed to hold a FOCAC Science and Technology Forum in due course and proposed to launch the China-Africa Science and Technology Partnership Plan to help African countries develop their own science and technology capacity.
>
> —The Chinese side will carry out 100 joint research and demonstration projects in the next three years.
>
> —The Chinese side will invite 100 African postdocs to conduct scientific researches in China.
>
> —The Chinese side will offer research instruments to all African scientific researchers who return to their home countries to work upon completion of their long-term joint research tasks in China.
>
> Noting the important role of technology transfer in enhancing African countries' capacity-building, China will encourage and promote technology transfer to Africa in various cooperation areas, in particular, the transfer of advanced applicable technologies with a major impact on Africa's economic and social development, such as technologies for drinking water, agriculture, clean energy and health. (FOCAC 2009b)

Technology cooperation and climate adaptation and mitigation are also important areas of other emerging powers' support for the MDGs in Africa. India founded its Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) plan in 1964, aiming to upgrade skills and build capacity and empowerment for developing countries. Under this framework, Indian government established the Special Commonwealth

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[7] See various issues of the CCS Weekly Briefing of 2011 and 2012, in which environmental concerns with regard to pollution, water management and wildlife protection have featured.

[8] The changing regulatory framework for the banking sector was also discussed during deliberations at the CCS workshop on ‚Greening China and her relations with Africa' in Stellenbosch, 17/18 May 2012.

Assistance for Africa Programme (SCAAP), with its coverage restricted to those African countries belonging to the Commonwealth (i.e. 19 countries). In 2009-2010, India provided assistance worth US$ 16.8 million under ITEC, US$ 1.8 million under SCAAP, and US$ 24.6 million as direct aid to African countries (*Africa Economic Brief* 2011b, p. 7).

In 2004, the government of India established the Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement (TEAM-9) for enhancing commercial relations between eight West African countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Senegal) and India. Under TEAM-9, India extended US$ 500 million lines of credit (LOC) to finance priority projects in the eight selected countries, targeting projects that would increase trade with India and contribute to African socioeconomic development. It also aimed to promote technology transfer (agriculture, small-scale industries, pharmaceuticals, and ICT).

## 6. Global Partnership (Goal 8)

To achieve the MDGs in Africa, there is a need for strengthened global partnerships to accelerate towards achieving the MDGs. Dedicated country strategies are important. Strengthened global partnerships are needed not only to avoid the reversal of progress to date, but also to bridge the implementation gaps and fulfil the promises to achieve the MDGs by 2015. China has contributed to building global partnerships to support the other seven MDGs, as discussed above. These efforts can be divided into three types. The first is in bilateral partnerships with African states, the second comprises engagements in established multilateral organisations and forums, and third type is organising global South–South groupings such as the G77 or the BRICS.

### *Bilateral settings*

The first type of efforts towards achieving the MDGs takes place in bilateral settings. FOCAC, assembling all 51 states that have diplomatic relationships with China, can be regarded as best practice of the bilateral partnership.[9] Founded in 2000, FOCAC has held five Ministerial conferences (the latest in July 2012) and one summit at the level of heads of state and government (in 2006). FOCAC has arguably provided the political umbrella for a boom of bilateral relations (Grimm 2012b). Trade volume between China and Africa in 2000 was about $10 billion, in 2011 it was $163 billion; during the time of FOCAC's existence, we have seen a 16-fold increase in trade since 2000 (Cissé 2012). Moreover, China's loans and concessional assistance financed a wide range of development projects. According to a 2011 report from African Development Bank, "China is a valuable trading partner, a source of investment financing, and an important complement to traditional development partners. China is investing massively in infrastructure, which helps alleviate supply bottlenecks and improve competitiveness" (Schiere 2011, p. 17). By June 2012, China had invested US$45 billion in Africa, including over US$15 billion of direct investment. Manufacturing, the financial sector and construction account for 60% and mining about 25% of Chinese investment in Africa. Over 2,000 Chinese companies of different types are operating in 50 African countries, and more than 85% of their staff are Africans (Wen 2012).

At the same time, China is also – and is very open about – reaping significant benefits from this relationship, through access to raw materials, expanded markets for manufacture exports, and the establishment of investment relationships, which could generate significant profits over time as well as diplomatic influence. In other words, by creating FOCAC and promoting bilateral relations, China and Africa built a mutually beneficial partnership for facilitating the MDGs on both sides (de Lugt 2011). This aspect of SSC is often regarded as controversial, not least because of the misunderstanding of motives for cooperation

[9] FOCAC was initiated by African states, aiming at a collective forum with China that's why the Chinese understanding, both official and academic, is rather emphasising the bilateral character, see LI Anshan 2012. It is interesting to note that foreign observers – and many Africans – rather emphasise the more than 50 states of the continent and thus understand FOCAC rather as multilateral platform. For such an assessment of FOCAC's political role, see Grimm 2012b.

as following an ‘enlightened self-interest’, i.e. not following a narrow economic definition of self-interest, from which comes the demand to ‘untie’ Chinese aid. The ‘tying’ of Chinese aid to Chinese service providers is, in fact, a fundamental element of *mutual* benefit, i.e. Chinese companies benefitting from cooperation while African states benefit from finished infrastructure.

*Multilateral settings*

The second type of global partnership gathers China and Africa together is the platforms provided by established multilateral organizations, for example, the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or the World Bank. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said at the second round of ministerial political consultations between China and Africa:

> ‘[We aspire to] Deepen practical cooperation and speed up the implementation of the MDGs. We should make concerted efforts to facilitate a shift in the international economic order and trading system that is conducive to developing countries, and create a sound external environment for them in meeting the MDGs. We should urge the international community, developed countries in particular, to step up support and input in development’. (YANG 2010)

For example, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) organises special SSC agreements, so that technicians and experts from emerging developing countries can work directly with farmers in host countries, sharing their knowledge and skills. Up to April 2010, 40 such agreements have been signed, among which are seven between China and African countries (table 1). As a major provider in support of FAO programmes for food security, to date over 800 Chinese experts and technicians have been fielded to all regions, including Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The technical areas mainly cover irrigation, agronomy, livestock, fisheries, crop production, agro-forestry, agro-mechanization, food processing, agro-marketing, farm tool making and others (FAO Representation in China 2011).

**Table 1: SSC agreements signed between China and African countries**

| Host country | Cooperating country | Signed |
|---|---|---|
| Gabon | China | 2007 |
| Sierra Leone | China | 2006 |
| Nigeria | China | 2003 |
| Ghana | China | 2000 |
| Mali | China | 2000 |
| Mauritania | China | 1999 |
| Ethiopia | China | 1998 |

Source: FAO, http://www.fao.org/spfs/south-south-spfs/ssc-spfs/en/.

As another example, China repeatedly called on the international community, under the leading role of the UN, to pay greater attention to the issue of sustainable development in Africa. In this regard, the Group of 20 (G20) is of great importance. The 5th FOCAC Ministerial Conference Action Plan declares that,

> The two sides stand for greater representation and say of Africa in international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and support greater dialogue between the G20 and Africa and Africa's participation in G20 affairs. The African side stressed the urgent need to increase the representation of the G20 and other existing international economic mechanisms. The Chinese side expressed its full understanding for this

> need and stressed that the existing international economic order should be more balanced to ensure the fair representation of Africa (FOCAC 2012b).

To put the G20 on the desk, China has contributed a lot directly to the realization of African MDGs.

*Global South-South settings*

The third type of global partnership for supporting African MDGs is the multilateral institutions between China and other Southern countries, many of them newly created, for example, the G77+China, the Non-Alignment Movement, the BRICS, and so on. Specifically, the BRICS are expected to have great potential in supporting the MDGs in Africa; the invitation of South Africa to the BRICS and recent discussions on the establishment of a BRICS development bank are indicators of the grouping's potential that is vividly discussed within South Africa. The discussion, however, is still in flux and national discussion about the expectations towards the BRICS might vary.

## III. New trends and future development

Considering the past activities, the current increase, and the still unfolding potential of SSC, we should clearly include the SSC experience and intellectual implications in the thinking about the future global development goal after 2015. Indeed, current global development thinking and practice are not just contributing to changes, but are facing the dual challenge of a changing context and changing expectations. This adds to the challenge of reaching the MDGs by 2015.

In the following, we argue that there are at least five recent developments that have great implications for these efforts.

### 1. The SSC perspective on the African continent

The rise of SSC is now a prominent development of international relations in general, and international development efforts in particular. Parallel to its contributions to development of both emerging powers and other countries in the South, SSC has significant implications for the mainstream thinking, policy and practice of the traditional donors.

On the one hand, we are witnessing a fundamental shift in perceptions of and attitudes towards the African continent, which some had regarded as a lost and "hopeless continent", as expressed in a notorious article in *The Economist* in 2000 (*The Economist* 2000). No single region of the world is poorer, more heavily in debt, or more besieged by civil wars, refugees, famine, preventable deadly diseases, and state repression, than Africa. On no continent is life more Hobbesian, quite literally, short, nasty, and brutish, than Africa (Diamond 2000). However, a decade later, the same magazine shifted its editorial judgment to "Africa Rising". Yet, Western public perception of Africa is presumably still largely sceptical about the future of Africa.

The emerging powers outside Africa have a different perspective. They tend to know far less about Africa than do some of the traditional donor countries. Yet, in their context, 'backward' is seen as a potential and market opportunity, rapid population growth is seen as a growing labour force and dynamics of growth, etc. As the Chinese government special envoy of African affairs Ambassador ZHONG Jianhua said at an international conference held May 2012 in Shanghai by Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), now we are talking about China's contribution to Africa's growth, however, with China's growth slowing down, ageing population, and rising cost of labour, among others, at some point in the near future the situation of asymmetrical interdependence will be reversed, at that time we need to talk about the contributions of Africa to China's growth (ZHONG 2012). In other words, Africa will provide opportunities and hopes for China's future development. Based on such an optimistic view towards African rising, China calls for policy consistency in terms of the forging of post-MDG global development consensus, both the 5th FOCAC Ministerial Conference Beijing Declaration and Action Plan call on the international community to, under the leading role of the UN, take seriously the inefficient implementation in the field of sustainable development, show the political will and commitment to build consensus, and reach agreement on the implementation plan of the post-MDG framework of sustainable development (FOCAC 2012a and 2012b).

Other emerging powers hold a similar view. For example, as Brazil courts Africa as a potential business location and source of energy supplies, while in practice it focuses on the Lusophone countries. One feature typical of Brazil's efforts to further develop South–South partnership include 'soft' public declarations of solidarity on the one hand and 'hard' economic, political, technical, and financial cooperation on the other (Schlager 2007, p. 8). South Africa emphasises Africa's potential also from a self-interest perspective, arguing that prosperity in South Africa requires a prosperous sub-region (Grimm 2011c). Russia, for its part, seems to be largely absent from this debate.

There are also benefits in SSC for African consumers. Traditionally, African states import high-quality European or US goods – or South African products, particularly in Southern Africa, but also beyond – but often too expensive for the majority. With the relatively cheap goods from China (most likely of lower quality given their much lower price), the poorer sectors now have some access to goods that were previously unaffordable. SSC also comes with easy access for African states/governments due to the non-interference policy (i.e. absence of political conditionality) adhered by most emerging development partners (Table 2).

**Table 2: Selected features of support provided by Africa's development partners**

| | Africa's share of aid budget (%) | Form of support | Conditions imposed | Mode of delivery | Debt relief provided | Monitoring mechanism |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Traditional donors | 35* | Mostly grants | Policy and non-policy conditions | Policy aspires to increasingly move away from projects in favour of SWAps and budget support | Yes | Peer review by other traditional donors as well as the Mutual Review of Development Effectiveness Report published by the OECD Secretariat and UNECA |
| China | 30–50 | Grants and loans | Non-policy conditions | Project | Yes | Forum on China–Africa Cooperation |
| India | 1.5–3.6 | Grants and loans | Non-policy conditions | Project | Yes | India–Africa Forum Summit |
| Brazil | 27–30 | Co- financing, often through triangular cooperation | Non-policy conditions | Project | Yes | Republic of Korea |
| Republic of Korea | 15* | Grants and loans | Non-policy conditions | Project | Yes | Republic of Korea–Africa Forum |
| Turkey | 6* | Grants | | Project | No | Turkey–Africa Cooperation Summit |
| Arab countries | 11* | Grants and loans | | Project | Yes | |
| South Africa | 95 | Co- financing, also through triangular cooperation | Non-policy conditions | Project | n.a. | |

Source: UNCTAD 2010, p. 67.

Furthermore, SSC has thus far proved reliable in delivery of commitments. Although some practical difficulties might result in occasional delays in functionality, delivery is timely and, according to anecdotal evidence from some policy makers in Africa (interviews in Rwanda, for instance), SSC projects generally see much quicker implementation (partly due to the absence of policy conditions). Difficulties in functionality with regard, for instance, to the establishment of Special Economic Zones are often due to domestic factors in African countries or difficulties in the use of donated medical equipment due to language barriers (Brautigam 2009; Alves 2011). To date there has not been any retreat from (or undue delaying of) previous commitments in China-Africa relations. Chinese engagement has revisited older projects and has repeatedly invested in them. There are thus still open questions around the sustainability of SSC, be it with regard to specific projects or with regard to the political sustainability of the overall concept (Brautigam 2009; Grimm et al. 2011).

**2. The global economic crisis is undermining the attainment of the MDGs**

From the 1990s until the onset of the crisis in 2008, developing countries, including low-income countries, made significant progress in human development. However, the crisis attacked two critical drivers of progress towards the achieving the MDGs: faster growth and better service delivery. The impact was negative both because of the severity of the recession and the tendency for human development indicators to decline much more in bad times than they improve in good times (World Bank 2010: 2). A lot of evidence demonstrates that the crisis has had hugely negative impacts on developing countries in the following ways, albeit not uniformly: reduced global demand for exports, mainly primary commodities; decline in capital flows including Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), private portfolio finance, remittances and ODA; and reduced income from tourism (Griffith-Jones & Ocampo 2009). These impacts have slowed MDGs progress.

Before the global financial crisis, there had been significant progress made on the MDGs, particularly in countries where governmental commitment was backed by strong policies and public expenditure, such as Ghana, Rwanda, and Vietnam. There were a lot of positive records globally between 2000 and 2005:

- 2 million lives were saved by reducing child mortality
- 30 million additional children (aged 6-12 years) now go to school
- 30 million additional families now have access to drinking water
- Boys and girls attend primary school in equal numbers[10]

However, progress is uneven. The reduction in global poverty is largely due to rapid recent growth in populous Asian countries: China, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Furthermore, the world is still off-track on a number of targets, especially relating to child mortality, maternal mortality and water. There are strong disparities across regions and countries. Indeed, most developing countries are not projected to meet most MDGs and Sub-Saharan Africa – despite some positive exceptions such as Ghana – lags very much behind (Bourguignon 2008).

Based on the comparison between the past and the current crises, the World Bank's *Global Monitoring Report 2010* stated that "the impact on the MDGs could be more moderate than in past crises" (World Bank 2010, p. 2). The report said that, as a result of the crisis, as many as 53 million more people will remain in extreme poverty by 2015 than otherwise would have. Even then, the developing world as a whole is still likley to achieve the first MDG of halving extreme income poverty from its 1990 level of 42% by 2015 (World Bank 2010, p. 15). However, a 2010 UNDP report shows a dimmer picture, stating that,

> MDG progress is also threatened by the combination of high food prices and the impact of the international financial and economic crisis. Economic growth declined in many countries, along with a reduction in foreign direct investment, remittances, as well as a fall in exports and tourist numbers, which led to significant job losses. Sustained poverty and hunger reduction is at risk because of vulnerability to climate change, particularly in the area of

[10] http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/research-development/index_en.htm.

> agricultural production. Weak institutional capacity in conflict and post conflict environments slows MDG progress. Rapid urbanization and growth in slum dwellings are putting pressure on social services. (UNDP 2010, p. iv)

The crisis clearly did not end in 2010. Triggered by the global financial crisis, the eurozone debt crisis currently involves a number of European countries to varying degrees, including Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy. The crisis first peaked in early 2010, as a result of Greece's large structural deficits and the increasing cost of financing government debt. The recent 5th Joint Annual Meetings of the AU Conference of Ministers of Economy and Finance and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, held in Addis Ababa 26–27 March 2012, claims that, the eurozone debt crisis,

> poses a serious risk for Africa's economic prospects […] The main potential transmission channels include trade exposure through falling demand for Africa's exports to Europe, sovereign risks (including reductions in official development assistance (ODA)), and liquidity risks that could affect other financial inflows such as foreign direct investment (FDI) and remittances, (AU & ECA 2012, p. 1)

As for the impacts of eurozone debt crisis on achieving the MDGs in Africa, the report states that,

> declines in aid flows as a result of budgetary restrictions in donor countries affected by the crisis are likely to lead to cuts in the funding of social programmes, since health, education and other social programmes targeting the most vulnerable are the most liable to suffer budget cuts.
>
> Depending on the changes in ODA flows over coming years, the living conditions for people in poverty may worsen. Over the short term, this will be especially true in the event of any sudden cuts in ODA resources to social sectors, such as health and education.
>
> Reduced inflows into Africa are likely to increase poverty levels by reducing the resources directed to the agricultural sector in Africa. (AU & ECA, pp. 11-12)

Because of the crises, it seems reasonable to assume that the traditional development donors will not provide sufficient resources to support the achievement of the MDGs in Africa. Part of the burden thus falls to the emerging powers, especially China, India, Brazil, and, to a lesser extent, South Africa. However, these emerging economies face a dilemma in balancing their support for Africa's efforts to achieve the MDGs with domestic growth and social equity requirements. This leads us to the third development.

### 3. China facing domestic needs and African expectations

Increasingly, since the financial and economic crisis that erupted in the USA in 2008, the emerging powers, especially China, came under enormous pressure to redefine their role in and contribution to global problem-solving. With their remarkable records of economic growth since the 1990s, these powers now have to engage proactively with a changing global order. However, one of the biggest challenges is how to balance the domestic and international expectations, how to plug the gap between the domestic needs and international expectations. Most of the emerging economies are still developing states, and consequently face their own challenges in meeting the MDGs by 2015. Thus, there is a tension between allocating resources to support MDGs in Africa and themselves being able to meet the MDG targets.

China is a case in point. China has made significant contributions to achieving the MDGs in Africa, yet, it faces often negative foreign perception of its role in Africa, even to the extent of accusations of neo-colonialism. Actions such as the unconditional provision of finance, selling of arms, or the protection of "rogue states" from international sanctions have come under fierce criticism, as they are regarded as having a negative impact on African societies and economies. The Chinese official position on this point is that countries need their own space for development and that China does not interfere in domestic affairs. Some observers also accuse China of instrumentalising its traditional emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference to carve out economic deals (Holslag 2006).

From an African perspective, China's involvement is regarded a mixed blessing. As Michael Chege pointed out, there are two extreme views about China's resounding economic entry into the continent.

> At one extreme, there is a growing literature based on a hyped "yellow peril in black Africa" syndrome blending into supposedly academic analysis on the subject, which shockingly reproduces some of the worst racial stereotypes this side of the Civil Rights Movement. The majority of what is written in this genre makes sweepingly alarmist, exaggerated, and ominous predictions on the long-term impact of China's trade and investment initiatives in Africa, for the West and for Africans. To the extent that it is based on any economic analysis, it tends to see China-Africa trade and investment as a "mercantilist" zero-sum game, in which Africa is mostly likely to lose while China gains.
>
> (The other extreme) treats China's contemporary economic activities in Africa as no more than a subset of globalization; that is, south-south trade and investment, partly underwritten by Western finance and technology in which the north and the south stand to gain. Subject to rule-based economic interaction between states, China's entry into Africa has the potential to increase economic and political competition in the continent that would result in an overall welfare gain for African peoples… (Chege 2008, pp. 18-19)

Despite these very different views, both the traditional donors and many in Africa hope that China would provide more support to African development in general and for the achievement of the MDGs in Africa in particular. In recent years, Africa's wish to cooperate with China (as manifested in FOCAC) has been growing. Expectations towards China are not only about more assistance so that African states can recover more quickyl from the crisis, but they also include transfer of technology and experience for African economies to upgrade their industries and create economic patterns. In addition, Africa expects more cooperative measures via FOCAC that help address issues like climate change, and they expect China to help Africa gaining a bigger say in the reorganization and reconstruction of the international system (Li Weijian et al. 2010, p. 28).

More specifically, Amoako (2011) from the African Center for Economic Transformation (ACET) in Ghana, summarized the priorities of African expectations toward China. While the relationship between China and African countries is multi-faceted and may give rise to many avenues for cooperation, he prioritizes five areas that would generate growth and have multiplier effects on African economies. These include: developing regional infrastructure, increasing local content in extractive industries, promoting Chinese investments in manufacturing to generate jobs and connect African business with global value chains and improving agricultural productivity through technological innovation and increased market access for African goods. The argument is along similar lines to those made by the Stellenbosch Centre for Chinese studies, pointing towards Chinese global responsibilities, including its contribution to African development, that are argued to come from direct and indirect effects of China's development on Africa (Grimm 2011).

Within China itself, the principal view held describes the country as Africa's "All Weather Friend", whose presence creates a win-win situation for both. China's role is defined by a number of key principles outlined in the 2006 *China's African Policy*, namely: sincerity, friendship and equality; mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity; mutual support and close coordination, and; learning from each other and seeking common development (*China's African Policy* 2006).

However, this does not mean there is only one, monolithic position on China–Africa relations within China. In fact, there are numerous questions especially with regard to providing assistance to Africa, including supporting the MDGs. The global financial crisis further complicates the situation within China. China is still a developing state with uneven progress between different areas, as repeatedly highlighted in official statements; consequently, a number of Chinese citizens question the rationale for providing international assistance while there are still urgent domestic needs. Even when looking at the sending of medical teams, which appears to be the only aspect of China-Africa relations that does not attract international criticism, there is a striking gap between the healthcare needs and capability within China. In order to nurture a better international image, China continues with its tradition of sending medical teams with the best doctors, nurses, and technicians, which arguably increases the domestic gap. This is a very tangible problem that Chinese citizens complain about (Zhang 2010).

**4. "Looking East" – in search of the "Asian" or "Chinese model"**

For the building of post-MDG global development consensus, we have to take the rise of SSC and new models of development into account as discussed above. With the emergence of new development "models", less developed countries turn their focus from traditional development donors to these new development partners, giving rise to the new trend of "Looking East", with a supposed "China model" at the core.

It is important to note that the policy of African states to look East does not exclusively mean to learn from China; the discussion includes aspirations to learn from Japan, India, South Korea, Malaysia and even Singapore or Turkey. Consequently, the Looking East policy means learning from the geographical East, mainly East Asia. For example, both Kenya's ambitious *Vision 2030* long-term development plan and *Ethiopia's Growth and Transformation Plan* draw heavily on similar concepts in Malaysia, Singapore and elsewhere in the region. All four foreign advisers on Kenya's key national planning body originate from East Asia, and pamphlets used to train cadres in Ethiopia's ruling party, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, use China, South Korea and Taiwan as examples of agricultural development and state intervention (Fourie 2011). Similarly, Rwanda draws on Singaporean and South Korean expertise and example (Grimm et al. 2011).

By taking a more distinctive path of foreign aid policy towards Africa than its DAC partners, Japan seeks to portray its own development model as a series of lessons which African countries could adapt and modify according to their own constraints and development objectives (Lehman 2008). Japan has now become a major donor in Africa. At one level, Japan's renewed assertiveness in providing foreign aid to Africa is on par with the more active approach taken by other donor countries. It might appear to some that Japan's motivations to lend capital and technical assistance to African countries are similar to those of other DAC lending countries (including a perceived competition with China). However, Japan's ODA policy makes important departures from the widely accepted ideology and policy objectives of the Washington Consensus (for instance in relying more on loans than grants and pursuing technical assistance much more than other OECD countries) and was, by some African interlocutors in Rwanda, rather regarded as "Asian" rather than "Western", thereby lumping Japan, South Korea and China (possibly also India) together as a somewhat distinct group of development partners (Grimm et al. 2011).

Both Indian and American pundits argue for the plausibility of an Indian development model, mirroring occasional discussions also in South Africa. Indians say that, in Africa, India's strength as an aid provider is that it is not a developed power, but one whose own experience of meeting development challenges is both recent and familiar. Furthermore, India is a somewhat deficient multi-party democracy with multi-layered governance in a multi-ethnic setting – thereby looking familiar to numerous African cases. African countries, it can be argued, might look at China and the USA with a certain admiration, but they cannot hope to become like either of them, i.e. a great global power. India is less clearly a global power (as yet) and therefore can more easily be portrayed as a land that has faced, and is still surmounting, problems rather similar to those confronting its beneficiaries (Tharoor 2011). The US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Robert Blake said on the occasion of the 2nd India-Africa Summit early 2011 that the Indian model for encouraging growth in Africa is very impressive (*IANS* 2011).

In addition, debates often also advocate the South Korean model. Among the efforts of heading to China, India, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore to seek a model for African development, the AfDB invited a South Korean specialist in November 2008, who spoke for South Korean development model. According to him, economic conditions in South Korea in the early 1960s were similar to those of a number of African countries currently marked by a lack of resources. He argued that South Korean experience of building up national consensus regarding the direction of major economic policies and proper government support and guidance, innovative local entrepreneurship and a diligent labour force, could serve as a model for Africa's future development (*Afrol News* 2008, Kim 2012).

The so-called "China Model" is consequently one element of a broader discussion that has become a hot topic since the adoption of some African states' Looking East policy. While it was previously believed that Western-dominated institutions could routinely instruct other countries to emulate US policies as a means to achieve lasting growth, the Chinese path (based on its own experience) is regarded as an alternative role model of an overall "rethink" of economic, financial and development policy (Cissé 2011).

However, from a Chinese perspective, China has not followed one single development path or economic model and the Chinese government and Chinese experts are careful not to claim a "China Model", let alone a "Beijing Consensus". Indeed, China has been more than cautious about validating a "one-size-fits-all" development strategy for Africa, rather arguing that African countries need to find and choose their own future path. As Dirlik (2006) argued, the "Beijing Consensus" key aspect may be its acknowledgement of the desirability of a global order "founded, not upon homogenizing universalisms that inevitably lead to hegemonism, but on a simultaneous recognition of commonality and difference." To some degree, therefore, the "China Model" is instrumental for discussions with Western donors and agencies, used to criticise Western development thinking and the subsequent policy prescription.

**5. Criticism of the path-dependence of international development efforts**

Based on the above argument, we acknowledge the need to include SSC and African views into any post-MDG global development consensus. Because it appears to be rather a distinctive feature in the negative ('not the Washington Consensus') projected onto what is regarded as an "Asian" or "Chinese model", we would, however, first need to review the main shortcomings of the traditional approach of doing development while acknowledge that the Asian model also may not suitable in the African context. The authors believe that there is a strong path-dependence to current international development efforts.

First, the notion of development is concerned with "progress", "growth" and "improvement" on the part of the less developed world (Bernstein 1997, p. 142). In fact the tradition "development" in Western political thinking drew somewhat from the body of theory on human evolution that had been prompted by the original advent of capitalism in the 15th and 16th centuries and the industrial capitalism (industrial revolution) in the late 18th century by various thinkers such as Hegel and Marx.[11] Uma Kothari and other post-colonial scholars have reminded us of the continuities and divergences between colonialism and development (Kothari 2005, pp. 425-446). This paradigm is a distinct product of global history understood as a relationship mainly between two poles: the advanced Western core and its periphery, i.e. non-Western societies.

Closely related to the above point, the notion of development assistance adhered by the traditional development partners is more about charity and less immediate related to motives of self-interest than to develop (unfold) own potential. From the outset, international development cooperation was meant to duplicate the experience of the Marshall Plan in Europe, expanding it to the less developed areas, especially Africa. While this did not yield the expected results in the 1960s and 1970s, and came with debt problems and restructuring efforts in the 1980s, the focus has shift to bringing basic social services, emphasising poverty alleviation (Finnemore 1996, pp. 90, 95). We can find similarities in the fundamental logic of the Marshall Plan, the poverty-alleviation effort, and the current MDGs. While the Marshall Plan resembles the optimistic confidence that foreign aid could help foster a "world without want", the contemporary notion is that – given sufficient and targeted aid flows – we can "end poverty in our time."[12]

Third, there is a path-dependence in relying on technical means to pursue some much broader social-economic goals. Initially, traditional development donors did pursue some very broad social and economic goals with modernisation plans. However, with repeated failures – partly due to the constant shifting of the theme (we will discuss this below), traditional donors try hard to develop the technical means to promote this course, from structural adjustment to good governance, from aid effectiveness to results-based

[11] For more on the origins of theories of development in western thought see Leys1996, p. 4-5.
[12] About this similarity, there are two books titled with these two different phases, see Hoffman 1962 and Sachs 2005.

management (RBM). The trend of technicalisation, of engineering development, has been increasing since 1970s.

Finally, there is a tendency to oversimplify the debates with promoting panacea solutions or once-and-for-all approaches in doing development. For the traditional donors, the Marshall Plan was such a positive experience that it merited replication. However, the shortcomings of the first decade of development cooperation showed the deficiencies of the approach, which called for rethinking basic assumptions and approaches. Since then, development cooperation has seen repeated cycles. Every ten years or so, there is a radical shift of the mainstream development discourse, with modernisation in the 1960s, basic needs in the 1970s, structural adjustment in 1980s, good governance and human rights in 1990s, and concerns with aid-delivery processes and the measurability of effectiveness (including the MDGs) in early 21st century. Now, we are talking about forging a new global development consensus.

While it is unclear what exactly China brings that is so different from the deficiencies of traditional ODA, the projection of various aspirations – not least, the leeway to find their own solutions and define their own policies – is the major attraction, as discussed above. The argument in China is, in fact, rather defensively developed, as there is a feeling that Western scholars dominate the discussion of SSC because of a more advanced theoretical approach in the West and as yet only limited systematic knowledge and experience on the Chinese side. The discussion is thus not driven by the question "What exactly can we learn from China", but rather by a discussion of features in China's development that are regarded as desirable in Africa – which can range from various policy emphasis (more infrastructure, more agriculture) to political system features (more centrally directed, more political control), depending on the situation and government convictions in the respective African country. Our main point is that such a path-dependence in international development efforts has significant negative impacts, which perhaps is the deepest rationale for creating a new global development consensus, along with other elements. The key challenge is the answer to what should a new global development consensus should look like?

**IV. Implications for a post-MDG global development goal**

As the MDG target date of 2015 gets closer, the debate is intensifying about what went right and what went wrong, and – perhaps more importantly – what kind of goals should be set for the future. From the previous sections, a number of questions have emerged with regard to the MDG agenda for the coming years and beyond. What are the implications of the growth in SSC for the achieving of MDGs in the remaining years and the constructing of post-MDG global development goals? What are the roles of emerging powers, including the BASIC countries, in future efforts? What is the influence of less developed countries, especially African countries, in this process? What are the roles of multilateral cooperation (or, using the MDGs' term: global partnership), especially coordination between China and EU, in this effort? One of the most pertinent questions is about what will replace the MDGs after their expiry date in 2015.

**1. Towards a post-MDG global development goal**

Agreeing on a post-MDG architecture is not just a question of choosing which indicators of well-being or poverty to emphasize, or on which targets to focus, but also of deciding on the process to promote in coming up with any new set of targets. So far, there are three main options:[13]

- **MDGs version 1.1 – or more of the same.** This would simply extend the MDG deadline without any substantial changes in the indices, with or without a timeline. Economist Jeffrey Sachs has argued for a timeline of 2025, while others press for 2020. But is another five to ten years enough to make progress? Will more of the same provide enough inspiration to reach the goals?

- **Completely new design – or something a bit more radical.** We could try something completely different by creating some totally new targets, perhaps locally defined, with or without a timeline. How credible will it be to change targets if the previous set has not been reached?

[13] There are numerous contributions on future possible choices for post-MDG global development consensus, see for example Sumner and Tiwari 2010 and UNECA 2012.

• **MDGs version 2.0 – or combine the MDGs with something new.** We could build on the existing goals, making improvements based on existing research and consultation. One possibility would be to pursue an "inner core" of the existing MDGs, but add new and locally defined targets as an "outer core". Would the MDGs lose their political appeal with these modifications?

There are, from our perspective, three reasons for maintaining the MDGs. First, from a practical point of view, there is not enough time to formulate an entirely new set of targets. Remember, the MDGs took ten years to formulate and find global consensus. At the time of writing, there are only three years left. Given that establishing a new global development consensus is a very complicated process that needs substantial political momentum from all over the world, it seems more reasonable to extend the MDGs to find more time and flexibility. Second, as we have argued above, there has been a constant shift of global development themes, which brings benefits but also problems for the less developed countries. One of the most negative impacts of changing targets would, arguably, be to nurture a development industry instead of development that these targets aim at. Continuity of international development efforts might be less media-friendly, but it allows the less developed countries to concentrate on their development efforts instead of adjusting to another international agenda. And last, but not least, despite great global changes, the MDGs still remain relevant and need more input in the form of resources, energy, and political will.

However, we gave some good reasons for a revision of the MDGs by starting our discussion with the changes of the implementation environment of the MDGs, namely the transformation of international system, the global financial and economic crisis, the rising of emerging powers and Africa. Some key initiatives have arisen since the 2010 MDG summit that shed some light on what the goals should be after 2015 and how we should get there. For example, The UN's high-level panel on global sustainability, which prepared a report for the Rio+20 summit, suggested global sustainable development goals (SDGs) to replace the MDGs. It is clearly important that the Rio+20 and post-2015 processes are closely interlinked to combine efforts and to avoid duplication. The UN Economic and Social Council's committee for development policy examined the post-2015 question in March 2012. This was the start of a research initiative to strengthen the UN development agenda beyond 2015 by considering emerging alternative development models that could contribute to improving human wellbeing.

Based on the concerns of some continuity in a changing environment, there are good arguments to seek a middle path along the lines of what we called the MDGs 2.0.

Consequently, the authors argue for the following initiatives:

a. **A modified MDG 2.0 agenda to extend the MDGs for another five years, and fix the time horizon for the post-MDG agenda from 2020 to 2040 or even 2050.** A 15-year timetable for implementing the MDGs appeared reasonable in 2000, but it seems inevitable that in many African and Asian countries a number of goals will not be met. To extend the MDGs for another five years provides space to find more time to achieve the MDGs without diluting them too much. Moreover, it provides time to reach a consensus about the post-MDG agenda. To set a 20–30 year agenda for the successors to the current MDGs is hoped to keep the flexibility for guaranteeing the MDGs 2.0 momentum and avoiding unnecessary topic cycles.

b. **A modified MDG 2.0 should also streamline the goals structure by adjusting the existing MDGs and adding some new goals.** The goals 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 could, for instance, be made more concise. Goal 6 (health), for instance, with 3 sub-goals needs to be simplified into one, and the overlapping Goals 2 and 3 chould be collapsed into one. In the meantime, we need to include some new issues that have arisen in recent years into the MDGs 2.0. Such issues are, for example, global governance, climate change, and the question of priority for human development or human security.

c. **A modified MDG 2.0 should make the targets flexible.** Almost all of the current MDGs have a fixed target, contrary to MDG8, which this paper is most focused upon. The absence of flexibility might prevent a tinkering with the goals; it does, however, ignore different starting points for various countries/regions. The MDGs 2.0 should have a flexible target system that establishes a "target zone" for every goal with minimum and maximum targets. This might reduce their "selling point" to the public, but should not be seen as a race to the bottom. Given the different conditions for implementing the MDGs 2.0 in different places, all countries should be able to achieve the minimum target in the timeframe. Those with better capabilities would be free to pursue a higher target even beyond the maximum. It would also be possible to divide the overall timeframe into several periods and classify countries (thereby accommodating a more differentiated world), with different types of country setting the respective goals in different periods. We would, however, foresee more difficulties to reach agreement on this option.

d**. A modified MDG 2.0 should focus on political buy-in of all partners, building on diverse experiences.** A core necessity for reaching a consensus is the equal participation of all partners. China and other emerging powers regard international development efforts as defined currently as the product of deliberations driven mainly by the traditional development donors. The establishment of a set of MDGs 2.0 would provide an opportunity to include all related actors, especially the emerging powers and the Global South. Only supported with the insights of the emerging powers and the Global South, the MDGs 2.0 have the sufficient political buy-in for their realisation – much of the MDGs appeal was that they had been formulated in the UN system. Furthermore, non-state actors should be included, namely with a view to their key role in supervision and assessment of the implementation and achievement of the MDGs 2.0.

**2. Implications for EU**

While was one of the key actors in formulating the MDGs in 2000, EU now is no longer the one who have a final say to the post-MDG global development agenda building. To achieve such a goal, EU has to join hands with and learn from others with emerging powers as one of the most important. First of all, with frustrated prospects of MDGs realization in Africa and shrinking capacity under the shock of European debt crisis, it urgently needs new inflows from the emerging powers. Secondly, with emphasis on development preconditions and related failure proved in the past 6 decades or more, traditional donor community, with EU at the core, realizes that development effectiveness approach, which more emphasized by SSC, is more important than aid effectiveness (HE 2011, pp. 122-3). Thirdly, with the rising of emerging powers and the implications of their development models, there is a need for absorbing fresh and innovative ideas into the traditional approach of doing development and supporting MDGs. And finally, the growing SSC has some self-reinforcement effects in terms of enhancing space for SSC internationally. Now, without joining hands with emerging powers and taking SSC into account, there will be no any possibility of building a post-MDG global agenda, means a great reversal of the past. As long as EU and other traditional actors have an open mind, a global development consensus among all actors is full of potential.

With regarding to the run-up to 2015 and the post-MDG global development consensus building, the EU should see Africa as a strategic opportunity, treat it as a full-fledged partner and learn more from the SSC and emerging powers. The EU can potentially play the leading role in formulating the new consensus by：

(1) leading the forging of MDGs 2.0, using its rich experience in formulating development goals and better understanding about the challenges that less developed countries are facing. The EU thereby can – and should – build on its advanced level of development and long historical linkages; the latter will have to be nurtured if they are to be positive;

(2) regarding development cooperation more holistically, i.e. putting less emphasis on aid policies and more emphasis on combining various policies into country- and situation-specific packages. The Economic Partnership Agreements might have been one such attempt, but they built on the wrong pre-condition of opening markets for European products in a situation where competition was not among equals;

(3) supporting African capacity development, rather than securitising development policy in Africa. This require EU to correct its focus on development itself rather than preconditions of development, especially not set specific preconditions for Africa or for trilateral cooperation with emerging power in Africa;

(4) striving to keep cost lower, and speeding up implementation. This will also require more compromises with regard to the highest EU standards and policy areas such as agricultural policies, and to discern the complementarities between SSC and EU, for example, how to combine SSC's successful

experience in hard infrastructure assistances and EU's strong point in soft ones, how to combine SSC's pragmatic approach with EU's rule-based approach, etc.;

(5) engaging with SSC by continuing and deepening multilateral dialogue and/or cooperation mechanisms, such as trilateral mechanisms that include all SSC partners, thereby strengthening experience sharing and knowledge exchanges with the Global South, especially the emerging powers.

### 3. Implications for emerging powers

With their rapid economic rise, the emerging powers have been and will continue to be key partners for the realisation of the MDGs and the forging of the new global development goals. For emerging powers, to strengthen global partnership benefits not only the realization of MDGs, but also the forging of a post-MDG development consensus. At least three considerations support such a conclusion. First of all, to keep rising, emerging powers have to consolidate their cooperation with African countries, not only limited in economic field, but also political and social dimensions. As an overall development goal, MDG provides a strategic venue for them. By engaging global partnership and contributing to building of post-MDG agenda, emerging powers can forge a broader camp for arguing for the reform of existing international order which was determined by the power structure of the past decades but not current ones. Another consideration is to improve their national images abroad. One product of the rising of emerging powers is the growing of appetite for natural resources, which wins a bad fame for emerging powers, with China the most notorious one. To improve their international images and soft power, it's necessary to contribute more global public goods. Finally, under the background of protracted economic crisis, the successful stories of emerging powers gained more weights that will contribute a lot for strengthening of emerging powers' discursive power on international stage. With numerous discussions about 'China Model', 'India Model', and other Models, participation into the forging of post-MDG global development consensus provides an opportunity for gearing the core concepts of various Models into this new global agenda.

However, in terms of proactive international engagement, the emerging powers are still too hesitant or too weak. More self-assure and well-founded engagement might result from better collective mechanisms or platforms among emerging powers themselves. The only meaningful international platform created by the emerging powers thus far is the BRICS grouping.[14] However, there is still a lot of scepticisms about the future of the BRICS because of many reasons, for example, the differences of political regimes, the position on climate change, the disagreement of agricultural policy, the territorial disputes between China and India, and so on (de Jesus 2012b).

Secondly, the direct engagement of the South has had such a short substantial history that understanding about it is limited, although research about it has been conducted by traditional powers and multilateral organizations. As discussed above, SSC was historically mostly limited to a form of ideological interaction during the Cold War. Only after this did economic exchanges across the Global South assume much significance. Direct interactions between states and particularly societies in the South were therefore mostly limited to the immediate neighbourhood. It is only recently that Africans and Chinese, for instance, are directly engaging and directly collecting knowledge of and experiences with each other. This direct interaction is still in its infancy and needs to be boldly developed – academically, economically, personally.

Related to this, the mutual understanding across the Global South is very poor. Taking China, even if policy attaches greatest importance to Africa, the continent is too far away for most Chinese to understand and invest in; there is huge gap between policy and implementation. The relationship is even more distorted in the other direction. There are only a limited (albeit rising) number of African students in China, and of African traders in Guangzhou, Yiwu and elsewhere. It is startling that there is only one academic institution in the African continent fully dedicated to the analysis of China – the Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch in South Africa (Africa-Asia Confidential 2012; Carayannis and Olin 2012).[15] Decisions are thus

[14] If we talk about the institutions or groupings created by the South, then the G77+China, the Non-Alignment Movement are another two have to take into account, see de Jesus 2012a.

[15] Other institutions such as the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) in Johannesburg or

from low levels of information in Africa – as they are in China. Despite much Western attention and because of more urgent calls in East- and South-East Asia, for example the South China Sea or North Korea, Africa is at the bottom of the priority in the Chinese research community, much to the chagrin of Chinese Africanists.

Finally, the emerging powers also have weak knowledge about how best to engage as large and increasingly wealthy powers (often regarded as 'developed' by African actors, not least due to a lack of knowledge of Chinese and other emerging countries' social realities). In the past, arguments against new donors depended largely on an over-simplified dichotomy of "emerging versus traditional" that assumed the former to be distinct or even idiosyncratic in aid strategy, value orientation and performance. This is true in certain aspects, including an emphasis on infrastructure and tied aid. However, it is interesting to note that there is significant variation among and also within the emerging powers; and there are great similarities among emerging and traditional powers in terms of development efforts, not least as the former are learning from the latter (see for example Woods 2008).

In a nutshell, the emerging powers should strengthen themselves as a group, learn from each other's various interactions, invest in better understanding the partners from the Global South, and learn more from the traditional development partners. More specifically, emerging countries should:

(1) strengthen the BRICS, especially by deepening the learning exercises and mutual exchanges, as well as by opening the possibility for future members to join, for building greater consensus in development of the Global South, including developing the post-MDG global development consensus;

(2) create new platforms between the emerging powers for discussing specific issues, for example, WTO Doha Round negotiation, the global climate change (e.g. the BASIC grouping), MDGs 2.0, etc.. This will enhance experience sharing within the Global South, mainly between the emerging powers and the others, in such fields as development, security, governance, poverty reduction, etc.;

(3) invest more resources and energy in the existing or future South–South cooperation platforms, to improve understanding their respective and at times common concerns. For this, they will have to participate more in global development efforts, enhance exchange, coordination, and cooperation with multilateral organizations, traditional development partners, and civil society organizations.

## 4. Implications for Africa

Africa is showing signs of an economic rise (dubbed a 'renaissance' by some) but it is still structurally and economically weak. To move further towards attaining the MDGs and increase its voice in the process of formulating a new global development consensus, there is still a long way to go for Africa as a whole. This agenda cannot be addressed singlehandedly by one African state.

Internally, the African continent and individual states have to build their own capabilities in terms of their own ideas about what they need and what should be done for the future development. These capabilities include not only the choice of development model, path, approach, and national strategy, but also fair distribution of social welfare, pro-development and pro-poor social policy making, and participation of civil society. These capability-building efforts should happen (and be coordinated) on three different levels, including the continental organisations such as the AU and its socio-economic programme, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEAPAD). Regional organisation will have to play a role as the building blocks of ultimately one African economic community. And, last but not least, national capability will have to be worked at; implementation is happening at national level or it is not happening. The global targets should be adapted and broken down into national goals to make the MDGs or MDGs 2.0 more locally relevant, for example, some kind of national and/or regional strategies and action plans.

Externally, the African continent and its states should pro-actively optimise the division of labour between African themselves and external partners. There are three types of division of labour. The first type

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the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) in Nairobi run programmes on China-Africa relations. There is, however, no other institution focussed on the analysis of China and her relations with African states.

is the division of labour between African continental/regional organizations and African states, as mentioned above. The second type is the division labour between African institutions and the multilateral organizations, especially the UNDP, IMF, the World Bank, the OECD-DAC, and so on. These multilateral development organizations have very significant (and possibly overly strong) influence on Africa's development and the achievements of MDGs as well as setting the development approach. Being in a weaker position, Africa will have to defend its ownership of development, present its real needs, and insist in the principle of "African Solutions to African Problems". The third type of a division of labour is the division between African states and individual development partners, both traditional and emerging ones. Lacking resources and capabilities, Africa has to rely on external support to achieve its MDGs and future development goals in the foreseeable future. However, African states should keep in mind that whatever the external supports might be, it can only function as a tool to support Africa's development course; the key determinant for any development is and remains on the African side.

Thus the authors suggest that Africa should:

(1) develop national development strategies at the country level and list the priorities according to their own situation, to build individual country's negotiating position in post-MDG consensus building. Development plans will have to provide a vision and provisions for (flexible, yet specific) steps towards their achievement;

(2) facilitate regional integration efforts and create a joint African position in the negotiations on post-MDG goals. This can and should be prepared rather sooner than later, in order to keep a momentum;

(3) coordinate and cooperate wherever possible with the emerging powers as this can help to strengthen the voice of the global south. Aspirations to change existing power structures will require a joint position against vested interests;

(4) promote experience sharing with the emerging powers and learn from different models – with the clear aim of developing some unique African models of development. This will have to be based on evidence on what works and what does not in specific contexts;

(5) keep the momentum of cooperation with traditional development partners and multilateral organisations in order to make themselves understood ; traditional donors still provide for the major part of development aid and trade opportunities, so they will remain instrumental for African development endeavours.

## 5. Implications for EU and China cooperation

Much has been written about the potential competition between China and the EU in Africa, however, The EU and China share many objectives for the African continent (JIN 2010): economic growth, integration into the world economy, pursuit of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), conflict management and peacekeeping, to name but a few. The *Joint Press Communiqué of the 14th EU-China Summit* held on 14 February 2012 in Beijing states that,

> Both sides recognized the importance of achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals and the imperative to reduce global poverty. Both sides will support the international community in achieving the UN MDGs. They shared the views that the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro in 2012 offers an opportunity to enhance green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, and to reinforce the Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development and agreed to work together to promote global cooperation in this regard. (*Joint Press Communiqué of the 14th EU-China Summit* 2012)

The document introduced by Commission of the European Communities in 2008, *The EU, Africa and China: Towards trilateral dialogue and cooperation*, has proposed four fields of potential cooperation, including peace and security in Africa, support for African infrastructure, sustainable management of the environment and natural resources, and agriculture and food security (Commission of the European Communities 2008).

The *Joint Statement of the 10th China-EU Summit*, adopted in November 2007, says that "Leaders [...] reiterated their commitment to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and global sustainable development in a balanced and coordinated way", and listed several priority fields for cooperation, including climate change, agriculture, technology, health care, etc" (*Joint Statement of 10th China-EU Summit* 2007).

If we combine the suggestions of these documents, there are several potential fields that call for China-EU cooperation in order to facilitating partnerships to achievement the MDGs and related capacity-building initiatives. China and the EU should:

(1) cooperate to facilitate the realization of: goal 1 target 1A and 1C by jointly providing support for African food security (most notably with investment in African agriculture and agricultural research); goal 2 and goal 3 by joining hand in building primary schools in Africa (combined with support in teachers' training); goal 4, 5, and 6 with focusing on target 6C by jointly providing health care support (combined with training of medical personal); goal 7 by converging programmes related to climate change, natural resource management, and infrastructure assistance (with training and learning platforms for public management). By doing so, both sides would also serve the promotion of goal 8;

(2) take a gradual approach toward trilateral cooperation in Africa, based on clear and open communication with Africans right from the start and keeping in mind what Africans need, whether African agree, and how to draw Africans into the cooperation;

(3) organise joint discussions on post-MDG development consensus building including Europeans, Chinese, and Africans, in order to stimulate debates within these regions, but also amongst them. There is a need to kick off trilateral academic exchanges on related topics. For this, all sides should make best use of multilateral organisations, both existing global and emerging ones, as the channel for organising trilateral side meetings on related topics.

## VI. Conclusion

This paper has argued for an urgency of building a new global development consensus based on the existing MDGs, but expanding them in order to include new challenges as well as catering for new framework conditions. One of these framework conditions that have changed is the fact of fast-growing SSC; between states of the emerging global South and other developing countries. While the discussion included India, Brazil, South Africa and other emerging countries, the focus of the discussion was on China.

SSC makes a contribution to achieving the MDGs, including Africa. If the MDGs are to be achieved, SSC will need to gain in importance in the future, due to enormous needs in the global South and crises affecting in the global North. Yet, finance is only one aspect and cooperation is far more comprehensive than mere development finance. The sustainability of SSC, however, is a question not yet answered.

Ultimately, the paper has sought to contribute to the discussion on what new global goals could be. It made recommendations to the EU, to emerging countries, and Africa as well as to EU-China cooperation on where to place the emphasis in the direction towards future development.

## The MDGs and Chinese engagement

Among the case studies for the European Report on Development are Rwanda and Côte d'Ivoire. According to World Bank figures, Côte d'Ivoire is clearly unlikely to achieve the MDGs, whereas Rwanda was considered on-track for achieving the MDGs by 2020 (see diagrams below). This might, at first glance, be surprising, giving the starting points of both countries with regard to the 1990 MDG baseline. While Côte d'Ivoire produces around 25% of the industrial output of Western Africa and had some nascent industries, Rwanda is a predominantly rural country with one of the highest population densities in the continent. Both countries have seen internal conflicts affect their development progress.

Despite relatively good starting conditions for Côte d'Ivoire by the 1990s, the country remains off-track for the MDGs; its performance is below that of Sub-Saharan Africa in most indicators. Côte d'Ivoire has only recently seen the end of a military internal conflict; the government of Alassane Ouattara has promised to elaborate national development plans in the near future.[16]

**MDGs: Where do we stand in Cote d'Ivoire?**

mdgTrack Global Index for Cote d'Ivoire is 25%.
*The country is off track*

| | Progress | Achieving target in... |
|---|---|---|
| **Goal 1** Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger | off track | 2025 |
| **Goal 2** Achieve universal primary education | off track | 2021 |
| **Goal 3** Promote gender equality and empower women | off track | 2025 |
| **Goal 4** Reduce child mortality rate | off track | 2025 |
| **Goal 5** Improve maternal health | off track | 2025 |
| **Goal 6** Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases | on track for 2015 | 2015 |
| **Goal 7** Ensure environmental sustainability | on track for 2020 | 2019 |
| **Goal 8** Develop a global partnership for development | on track for 2015 | 2015 |

Sources: TAC mdgTrack, The World Bank: MDGs




Sources: TAC mdgTrack, The World Bank: MDGs

Rwanda, for its part, has lived through a genocide in 1994 that physically and psychologically destroyed the country. Reconstruction of the economy and the society has taken place under a government that has been criticized for its authoritarian tendencies. The government has, however, worked on policy guidelines and donor coordination quite substantially and is thus often regarded as observing good practice in terms of its development orientation.[17] This reputation is reflected in the better performance when measured against the MDGs. Despite persistent high levels of extreme poverty and being off-track with regard to MDG 1 (eradicate extreme poverty and hunger), Rwanda is outperforming Sub-Sahara Africa in many of the indicators, as can be seen in the diagram below.

[16] http://www.mdgtrack.org/, viewed 22 June 2012.

[17] As argued elsewhere, Rwanda is a good example for African agency even if highly aid dependent. See Sven Grimm, "Aid dependency as a limitation to national development policy? – The case of Rwanda", in William Brown/ Sophie Harman (eds), "African Agency", Routledge (forthcoming).

**MDGs: Where do we stand in Rwanda?**

mdgTrack Global Index for Rwanda is 41%.
*The country is on track for 2020*

| | Progress | Achieving target in… |
|---|---|---|
| **Goal 1** Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger | off track | 2023 |
| **Goal 2** Achieve universal primary education | on track for 2020 | 2020 |
| **Goal 3** Promote gender equality and empower women | on track for 2015 | 2011 |
| **Goal 4** Reduce child mortality rate | off track | 2025 |
| **Goal 5** Improve maternal health | off track | 2025 |
| **Goal 6** Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases | on track for 2015 | 2015 |
| **Goal 7** Ensure environmental sustainability | on track for 2020 | 2016 |
| **Goal 8** Develop a global partnership for development | on track for 2020 | 2016 |

Sources: TAC mdgTrack, The World Bank: MDGs




Sources: TAC mdgTrack, The World Bank: MDGs

For the specific focus of this report – South-South Cooperation with an emphasis on Chinese cooperation – we face the problem of lack of country-specific data of Chinese development cooperation. While investment figures are published, aid data are not available on a country-by-country basis (Grimm 2011b). Previous research mapped Chinese and other development partners' activities in Rwanda (Grimm et al. 2011). With this empirical research as a basis, we will focus on Rwanda in the following section.

### A. Support to Rwanda from external partners

Rwanda is a highly aid-dependent country. Total aid amounted to slightly more than half of national finance in 2009; in recent years aid has accounted for around 20% of GNI.[18] The increase in GNI outstrips the increase in ODA from US$ 581 million in 2006 to US$ 931 million in 2008.[19] Nonetheless, the figure of 21% of the GNI being given as aid demonstrates the persistence of Rwanda's dependency. General budget support (GBS) and sector budget support (SBS) is expected to make up 22% of the national budget (Grimm et al. 2011). In addition to budget support in its various forms, donors support the Rwandan government with project aid, the share of this included in the budget accounting for 35% of the national budget.

The scarce resources of the small country are facing a tremendous task with coordinating donors. With these high levels of dependence on external finance, donors are operating in a "crowded" environment in Rwanda. There were 29 bilateral donors engaged in Rwanda in 2010 of which 23 were members of OECD DAC and six were not.[20] Of the former group of donors, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA and the two Asian DAC members Japan and Korea engaged bilaterally in and with Rwanda. Additionally, in the OECD database, Spain, Norway, Portugal, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Australia, Greece and Ireland were also active in the country (compare also Tew 2009), operating mostly through NGOs or UN agencies; they were not represented by an embassy in Rwanda and projects/programmes of these actors were not encountered on the ground. Multilateral agencies present were the World Bank, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the European Union (EU), the Global Fund, the Nordic Development Fund, several Arab Funds (Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), Kuwait Fund, Saudi Fund, OPEC) and various UN agencies. This list does

[18] The ratio of net ODA to gross national income (GNI) averaged 21 per cent (2006: 20.5 per cent; 2007: 21.6 per cent; 2008: 21.1 per cent). Cf. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/19/1878421.gif and http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/12/1893167.xls, viewed 4 January 2009.
[19] Cf. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/12/1893167.xls, viewed 4 January 2009.
[20] The Rwandan DAD only covers 14 DAC donors as well as the 6 non-DAC donors.

not individually include the numerous UN agencies or the multitude of international non-state actors in Rwanda.

**B. South-South Cooperation in Rwanda**

With regard to SSC, a number of "emerging countries" were active in Rwanda, namely: China, India, South Africa, and Egypt. Among the Southern development partners are also various Arab donors agencies (BADEA, Kuwait Fund, Saudi Fund, Egypt). Cuba and Nigeria were involved in sending medical staff to Rwanda, but do not transfer funds. Similarly, but at the highest political level, Singapore and South Korea were reportedly engaged with technical advisers in the Presidency (Grimm et al. 2010). It is generally difficult to make general statements on the volume of SSC as data are not systematically collected and reported by the Rwandan government; figures have to be based on estimates and interview data.

China certainly is the most substantial SSC partner for Rwanda, not only with respect to the financial scope of its development cooperation but also because of its diverse activities in technical and financial cooperation conducted in different sectors. Chinese engagement is difficult to track for the Rwandan government in monetary terms due to the ineffective bureaucratic process in sharing information among government units. In the overall financial volume (commitments of about US$20 million with sizable disbursements in 2009, see Table 4) China's engagement in absolute terms is of a similar size to that of traditional donors Canada, Sweden and Belgium. India only recently gained in importance as a partner for Rwanda. In early 2010, India signed an agreement with the Rwandan government to finance the construction of the Nyabarongo power plant.[21] However, and much in line with overall data for Africa (cf. ECOSOC 2008), India was a smaller partner than China and the Arab Funds (when counted together). Although, at first sight, Indian commitments are almost equal to Chinese ones (see Table 1), India has not yet started to disburse any funds, as all activities in relation to the Nyabarongo plant are still in the planning phase. It is likely to become a more important donor to Rwanda in the future.

**Table 4: SSC in in Rwanda as of 2010 (in US$ million)**

| Donor | Commitments (Jul 09-Jun 10) | Disbursements (July-Dec 09) | Execution rate (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| China | 20.65* | 6.29 | 30.5 |
| India | 20.57* | 0 | 0 |
| BADEA | 10.00 | 0.15 | 1.5 |
| Kuwait Fund | 5.10 | 0 | 0 |
| Saudi Fund | 8.95 | 0.70 | 7.8 |
| OPEC | 8.29 | 0.34 | 4.2 |
| *Memo item: Arab Funds total* | *32.34* | *1.19* | *3.38* |

* Commitments for calendar year 2009.
Source: CEPEX 2010b, calculated in USD based on average value of FRW in USD in 2009.

Other non-DAC partners include Arab and African donors, the latter being very small in substance. During research in early 2010, no ongoing activities of the Arab Funds were found in Rwanda. However, the presence of the funds was visible through terminated projects such as Kigali road construction (conducted by Chinese contractors) or the King Faisal Hospital. South Africa's development cooperation, for its part, focuses on countries on the African continent; Rwanda is one of the partners outside the Southern African region. Main areas of South African engagement concern interventions on peace building and keeping,

[21] The New Times, 27 January 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201001270015.html, viewed 1 July 2010.

regional integration, the promotion of good governance, economic development and human resource development. South Africa provides both loans and technical assistance.

**C. Chinese cooperation with Rwanda in the light of the MDGs**

Chinese cooperation with Rwanda must first be placed in the context of the China's more general African Policy. China is not a newcomer in providing assistance for Africa, nor is it a new partner for Rwanda. China has been giving assistance to African states since the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949; its engagement in Rwanda dates back to 1971.

Overall, the research team was given the lump-sum figure for Chinese aid to Rwanda from 1971 until today of RMB 1 billion (around US$ 147 million), composed of 49% (US$ 72 million) in grants, 32% (US$ 47 million) in zero-interest loans and 21% (US$ 31 million) in preferential loans, according to Chinese information, obtained in an interview in Rwanda in 2010.[22] The more recent figures – compared to this lump sum – indicate the steep increase in Chinese assistance to Rwanda (and Africa more broadly) in recent years.

The attribution of these sums by sector show an engagement in MDG relevant areas, such as education, health, agriculture and (more broadly) infrastructure. Table 2 provides an overview of projects found in Rwanda in early 2010, listing all project initiated since 2000. In addition to the projects listed, a study by the Ghanaian think tank ACET (2010) lists the following projects that the authors of this study did not come across during field research in Rwanda. These projects were the provision of technical assistance for rice cultivation in Umutara (2000) (in agriculture), and the donation of the new Kibungo Nursing School (2005) (in the health sector). Also listed under 'Trade and Investment' is the construction and operation of Rwanda's only cement plant (1984 – 2006), which was then privatised (China still holds 10% of shares). The project list of the Chinese Embassy in Rwanda also includes this project (although the timeframe is indicated as 1984–2003).

**Table 2: Chinese cooperation projects in Rwanda since 2000**

| Sector of engagement | Project (with year of completion) | Value* |
|---|---|---|
| Education | Confucius Institute operating in Kigali (since 2009); it grants Rwandans 29 or more scholarships annually | ? |
| | Construction of two rural schools, each at USD 800,000? | US$ 1.6m |
| Infrastructure | Exim Bank concessional loan (3-5 per cent interest), with a 35 per cent grant element from an overall USD 36 million loan for road rehabilitation/maintenance in Kigali (36 km) | US$ 30m |
| | Construction of the Kinyinya–Nyarutarama road in Kigali | ? |
| | Construction of the Amahoro Conference Hall (2004) | ? |
| | Construction of the Foreign Ministry (2009) | US$ 8.6m |
| | Construction of the Amahoro Stadium (2005) | ? |
| Agriculture | Agricultural Demonstration Centre (rice, mushrooms, silk, soil protection) in Butare | US$ 5.3m |
| | Joint Agriculture Cooperation Project in Kabuye | ? |
| | China Aid Bamboo Project in Kabuye | ? |

[22] NB: The figures also illustrate a rather general problem with aid figures: they cannot be exact since, added together, the shares exceed the total by 2%.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Health | Construction of the Kibungo hospital | ? |
| | Medical team in Kibungo (deployed since 1971) | ? |
| | Donation of anti-malaria drugs to the Health Ministry | ? |
| | Construction of a new hospital in Masaka (Kigali Province), also staffed by Chinese doctors | ? |
| Cross-cutting | Commitment to send 8-10 youth volunteers to spend 1 to 2 years in Rwanda. They are still being sought in China. One volunteers is based at the Confucius Institute Kigali. | ? |
| | Commitment to professional human resources training for Rwandans in China | ? |
| | Tax-free entrance for 80 % of Rwandan exports to China | ? |

* The values are as indicated by interviewees, in some cases converted from RMB into dollars by the authors at current US dollar values (mean value based on the daily exchange rates of the first half of 2010).

Source: based on Grimm et al. 2011.

China is clearly active in key sectors for Rwandan development and in those outlined by Rwandan development strategies, engaging in health and education (both closely related to the MDGs) and in agriculture as well as in infrastructure. Scholarships for Rwandans can be assumed to want to build capacities and to create personal linkages/networks at the same time. According to the ACET study, Chinese commercial engagement in Rwanda has little to do with what was referred to in discussions in Rwanda as the "suspicious sectors," such as mining. Rather, Chinese engagement was found in ICT, manufacturing and technology, albeit to a relatively small extent. Large companies that have been active in Rwanda for a longer time, however, are found only in the construction sector. Additionally, China, also being a member of international organisations, indirectly supports UN activities on the ground. Operations are conducted at project level only, i.e. China has not participated in SWAps or budget support.

Chinese engagement has been criticised for a lack of transparent reporting on financial flows – both by other development partners and by some Rwandan officials (cf. Grimm 2011b). Despite the Chinese political declaration of "no strings attached," several Rwandan actors complained about the strict economic conditions attached to Chinese aid or, put differently, about the tied nature of Chinese assistance – acknowledging that "there is no such thing as a free lunch" (Interview with Rwandan official, April 2010). Overall, however, China is active in traditional sectors of development cooperation in Rwanda, such as health and education, where it is clear that its project assistance is development-oriented. The same can be said for the agricultural sector, where China has adopted a new approach (of commercial agricultural demonstration centres) which is not endorsed by other development partners, but which might yield benefits for Rwanda. Projects are too recent to make a full-fledged impact statement. The targeted sections, however, are clearly relevant to the MDGs.

**BOX 1: The Millennium Development Goals**

**GOAL 1: ERADICATE EXTREME POVERTY AND HUNGER**

♠ **TARGET 1.A** Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than $1.25 a day

♠ **TARGET 1.B** Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people

♠ **TARGET 1.C** Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

**GOAL 2: ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION**

♠ **TARGET 2.A** Ensure that by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling

**GOAL 3: PROMOTE GENDER EQUALITY AND EMPOWER WOMEN**

♠ **TARGET 3.A** Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and at all levels of education, no later than 2015

**GOAL 4: REDUCE CHILD MORTALITY**

♠ **TARGET 4.A** Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate

**GOAL 5: IMPROVE MATERNAL HEALTH**

♠ **TARGET 5.A** Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio

♠ **TARGET 5.B** Achieve by 2015 universal access to reproductive health

**GOAL 6: COMBAT HIV/AIDS, MALARIA AND OTHER DISEASES**

♠ **TARGET 6.A** Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS

♠ **TARGET 6.B** Achieve by 2010 universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it

♠ **TARGET 6.C** Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

**GOAL 7: ENSURE ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY**

♠ **TARGET 7.A** Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources

♠ **TARGET 7.B** Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving by 2010 a significant reduction in the rate of loss

♠ **TARGET 7.C** Halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation

♠ **TARGET 7.D** Have achieved a significant improvement by 2020 in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers

**GOAL 8: DEVELOP A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT**

♠ **TARGET 8.A** Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system (including a commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction, nationally and internationally)

♠ **TARGET 8.B** Address the special needs of the least developed countries (including tariff- and quota-free access for exports of the least developed countries; enhanced debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous official development assistance for countries committed to reducing poverty)

♠ **TARGET 8.C** Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island developing states (through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the outcome of the 22nd special session of the General Assembly)

♠ **TARGET 8.D** Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures to make debt sustainable in the long term

♠ **TARGET 8.E** In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries

♠ **TARGET 8.F** In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications

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