

# Possibility of Cooperation: China and EU in Darfur

ZHANG Chun

**Abstract:** Both China and the EU have made a lot of efforts to facilitate the resolving of the Darfur crisis; however, it seems that there are few achievements. Why? For China, there are two deficiencies: lacking of publicity of its diplomatic efforts and short of cooperation with the West. For the EU, its ideological and coercive means proved ineffective. Thus, both sides should cooperate in the following areas: reaching consensus on how to solve the Darfur crisis, and influencing the U.S. join into their common efforts; persuading Sudanese government and rebel groups to conclude a comprehensive peace accord; pushing forward a strategy of facilitating integration of Sudan domestic cultures and ethnics and races; promoting the communication between Sudan and relevant international organizations, especially the AU and UN; and lastly, contributing to Sudan and other Africa countries' modernization process.

**Key Words:** Darfur Crisis, China, EU, Cooperation

**About the Author:** Dr. of International Relations, Research Fellow, Department of West Asia and Africa Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies

## I. Introduction

Stepping into 2008, there are increasing pressures on Chinese government by which some individuals, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and even some countries want to China to compel Sudanese government to make concession on the Darfur issue. For example, the European parliament took an unprecedented step to

sanction China over its unwillingness to pressure Sudan to halt violence in Darfur on March 17, 2008. It decided to divest the shares it owned in Chinese oil giant PetroChina. A member of the parliament said that “the sale of the stockholdings in PetroChina sends a very clear signal that the European Parliament abhors that company’s links with a regime which does little to end the violent conflict in Darfur”.<sup>①</sup> Prior to that, the Hollywood director Steven Spielberg decided to withdraw from his role as an artistic adviser to the opening and closing ceremonies of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games in February. These events became a focus of the whole world because it was regarded as the second wave of such a tendency that some western countries and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) made an improper linkage between the Darfur crisis and Olympic Games and used it as a means to accuse Chinese government.

Meanwhile, given the instability of Darfur security situation, states have carried out a ‘shuttle diplomacy’: Ambassador Liu Guijin, Special Representative of the Chinese Government on the Darfur Issue, has paid visits to Britain and Sudan from February 21 to 23 and February 24 to 27 respectively; US special envoy to Sudan Richard S. Williamson also has visited Sudan at the end of February; and British Foreign Secretary David Miliband has visited China from February 24 to 29; and so on. China has the same goals with other countries, that is to keep peace and stability of Sudan in general and Darfur in particular, and to promote the standard of life there.

Chinese government has made great efforts to facilitate the resolving of the Darfur crisis, however, it seems that there are few achievements. Why? There are two main reasons. The first one is short of publicity of Chinese diplomatic efforts; the second is short of cooperation with the West. These two points make the Western embrace the chance to charge China without any negative consequence. To promote the resolve of Darfur Crisis and to alleviate pressures of Chinese government, China should cooperate with the Western countries, especially with the EU. The EU also has made some efforts on that issue but no any meaning of success. Additionally, the EU has big economical, ideological, and historical interest in that area. Thus, the EU is the first and best potential partner of China in Darfur. This is the starting point of

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<sup>①</sup> “EU turns up heat on China over Darfur crisis and divest from PetroChina,” *Sudan Tribune*, March 18, 2008, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26401>.

this paper. It focuses on Chinese and the EU's different perspectives of the source and nature of Darfur crisis, their different diplomatic approaches to it, and the possibility of cooperation. It falls into four parts. The next section analyses of the roots and nature of Darfur crisis, and discusses its 'should-be' comprehensive solution. Then the third section focuses on China and EU's interests in Sudan, and the challenges of Darfur crisis bring to these interests. After that, I would like to discuss Chinese and EU's diplomatic efforts for promoting the solution of Darfur crisis. Finally, as a conclusion, I will present some policy suggestions for China and the EU on how to cooperate on this issue.

## II. Darfur Crisis: Roots, Nature, and A Proposed Comprehensive Solution

There are different perspectives on the roots and nature of Darfur crisis among different countries, however, neither China nor EU agrees with the America's argument that it is an 'ethnic genocide' despite there have many cases that violated the international human rights and humanitarian laws.<sup>①</sup> However, China and the EU have different views on the Darfur's roots and nature. According to THE EU, the major cause of Darfur conflict is that Sudan government aims to maintain control of oil resources over the Arab minority area, and support the Arab militias, know as *Janjaweed*, to fight against the black African forces.<sup>②</sup> In China's perspective, however, Darfur crisis in nature is a struggle for resources among different ethnics which has been deteriorated by the environmental degradation and climate change. Many scientific research of UN Secretary-General BAN Ki-Moon, The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and other institutions and scholars have validated Chinese point view.

Sudan is on the leading edge of the continental demographic divide,

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<sup>①</sup> Rory Carroll, "Sudan massacres are not genocide, says EU," *The Guardian*, August 10, 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/aug/10/eu.sudan>; "Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui Attends the Ministerial Meeting of the Enlarged International Contact Group on Darfur," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, June 25, 2007, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjfb/zjzg/xybfs/gjlb/2883/2885/t334571.htm>.

<sup>②</sup> "A Merciless Battle for Sudan's Oil," *The Economist*, August 29, 2002, [http://www.economist.com/printedition/displayStory.cfm?Story\\_ID=1302474](http://www.economist.com/printedition/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=1302474); Gerard Prunier, "Willful Impotence: Darfur and the International Community," *Current History*, Vol. 105, No. 691 (May 2006), p.195.

where sub-Saharan black Africa melds with Arabic-speaking populations. Meanwhile, Sudan is also on the leading edge of the continental religious divide, where Islamist Arabian melds with Christian and primitive religion followers. This fact makes Sudan's ethnical and religious conflict much severe than other Sub-Sahara African countries.

Greater Darfur, a territory roughly the size of France or Texas and with an estimated population of about six million people, is Sudan's largest region in terms of landmass and population and the most concentrated region in terms of demographic and religious divide. Thus it is one of the least developed regions in the country with a long history of ethnic and racial strife. Located in the north-western region of the country, the region shares Sudan's international borders with the Republic of Chad to the west, Libya to the northwest and Central Africa Republic to the southwest. The ecology of the area ranging from desert in the north, fertile belt in the Jabel Marra region to mixed vegetation of the southern zone provide a massive resource base for agriculture resulting in conflict between sedentary farmers and itinerary nomads. In the past, such clashes have occurred between mainly Fur, Masalit and other 'African' farming communities' pastoralist 'Arab' tribes, particularly those from Beni Hussein from Kabkabiya region (North Darfur) and Beni Halba (South Darfur). Following administrative divisions in 1994, Darfur has been divided into three provinces: North, South and West. West Darfur comprises mainly of the Fur and Masalit, albeit with a panoramic mixture of other ethnic groups.<sup>①</sup> The pattern of farmers-pastoralists clashes cut across the three administrative divisions of Darfur but intensifies as a result of annual migration by pastoralists seeking greener pasture for their livestock.

In the past, clashes between cattle and camel rearing Arab tribes and sedentary African farming communities were often resolved through age-hallowed means of conflict resolution reinforced by Anglo-Egyptian legal heritages.<sup>②</sup> Acting as third party mediators, community leaders and tribal chiefs – Sheikh Kabilah – often serve as veritable tools for conflict management. These traditional mediation mechanisms often prove

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<sup>①</sup> Usman A. Tar, "Old Conflict, New Complex Emergency: An Analysis of Darfur Crisis, Western Sudan," *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2006), pp. 412–413; Human Rights Watch, "Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan," *Report of the Human Rights Watch*, Vol. 6, No. A (April 16, 2004), p. 5.

<sup>②</sup> For details of Anglo-Egyptian legal and political legacies over Sudan, see Peter Woodward, *Sudan, 1898–1989: the Unstable State* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1990).

fruitful resulting in compensations for lost crops, establishing the time and pattern of seasonal migration, as well as setting buffer zones for grazing. However, with the accelerating environmental degradation and climate change, the struggle for natural resources increased and the traditional mediation mechanisms invalidated.

UNEP has published its research findings on Sudan in June 2007, *Sudan: Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment*, concluded that complex but clear linkages exist between environmental problems and the ongoing conflict in Darfur, as well as other historical and current conflicts in Sudan. This report points out that because of a decline in rainfall, which is probably the result, at least in part, of man-made climate change, the rainfall of Darfur dropped greatly. This contributed to, directly or indirectly, large-scale forest clearance, loss of wildlife and severe land degradation. Rapid population growth – from around one million in 1920 to around six million today – made all of this far more deadly by slashing living standards. The result has been increasing conflict between pastoralists and farmers, and the migration of populations from the north to the south, which greatly deteriorated the old struggle for natural resources among tribes.<sup>①</sup>

On June 16th, 2007, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon published an article named *A Climate Culprit in Darfur* in *The Washington Post*, argues that the fundamental reason for Darfur conflict lies in climate warming. In this article, he pointed out that:

Two decades ago, the rains in southern Sudan began to fail. According to U.N. statistics, average precipitation has declined some 40 percent since the early 1980s...It is no accident that the violence in Darfur erupted during the drought. Until then, Arab nomadic herders had lived amicably with settled farmers. A recent Atlantic Monthly article by Stephan Faris describes how black farmers would welcome herders as they crisscrossed the land, grazing their camels and sharing wells. But once the rains stopped, farmers fenced their land for fear it would be ruined by the passing herds. ...Fighting broke out...<sup>②</sup>

Some other scholars and observers agree with the above views. Didrik Schanche, NPR's foreign desk editor, argues that the deadly

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<sup>①</sup> UNEP, *Sudan: Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment* (Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme, 2007); Jeffrey D. Sachs, "No Development, No Peace," July 2007, Project Syndicate, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/sachs131>.

<sup>②</sup> Ban Ki Moon, "A Climate Culprit in Darfur," *The Washington Post*, June 16, 2007, p. A15.

conflict in Darfur has deep roots in a vast, and arid long-neglected region in Sudan's west, where battles over water and grazing rights stretch back generations. The world wide climate change worsens such a resource struggle. The demographic shift that plays out across Africa's north helps feed the conflict.<sup>①</sup>

Wangari Maathai, a Kenyan environmentalist and winner of the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize, described the roots of the conflict. “To outsiders, the conflict is seen as tribal warfare. At its roots, though, it is a struggle over controlling an environment that can no longer support all the people who must live on it,” she said in an interview with *The Washington Post*.<sup>②</sup>

It is the collapse of traditional dispute settlement mechanism that complicated the struggle for natural resources. For lacking of effective governance and the widespread of small arms, such an ecological strife transferred into a struggle over public resources. Finally, Omar al-Bashir, president of Sudan, ordered to broaden minority Arabian political prerogatives into West Darfur in 1994, which speeded up the collapse of traditional dispute settlement mechanism. The current hostilities erupted in February 2003, when two black groups - The Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) - attacked government targets, claiming that the predominantly African region was being neglected by the Arab-dominated government in Khartoum, and arguing more equitable distribution of power and resources. As a means of response, Khartoum recruited proxy groups of local Arab minorities, known as *Janjaweed*, to carry out state-sanctioned killings, arsons, and rapes against the black African population of Darfur. Till now, more than 10,000 people had been killed and 1.2 million had been displaced.<sup>③</sup>

Thus, Darfur crisis is not an ‘ethnic genocide’ that American government charged, it is a struggle over natural sources mainly between Arabian and African black tribes, complicated and deteriorated by the global climate change. Meanwhile, there are indeed many cases of violation of international human rights laws and international humanitarian laws. In this regard, Darfur crisis needs international efforts to keep itsa peace and stability. As far as the roots and nature of

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<sup>①</sup> Didrik Schanche, “Scarce Resources, Ethnic Strife Fuel Darfur Conflict,” *NPR*, October 29, 2007, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6425093>.

<sup>②</sup> Jim Hoagland, “Seeds of Hope in Africa,” *The Washington Post*, May 12, 2005, p. A21.

<sup>③</sup> YANG Ziai, “Where Darfur Go?,” *China Daily* (Chinese), October 29, 2007.

Darfur crisis, a comprehensive and rational solution should aware the following dimensions:

Firstly, given the independent foreign policy tradition of Sudan, it is important to respect for Sudanese sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its diversity of religion and demography. Thus the best way for solving Darfur crisis is not coercive sanctions, but a soft way through persuasion and private influence. Unlike other African countries, Sudan didn't have a single colonial power—it had two, Britain and Egypt. And insofar as Egypt was itself busy negotiating the terms of its domination by Britain and France, Sudan always maintained a line to Paris. After World War Two, Sudan won her independence by deftly playing off Britain, Egypt, France and the U.S.—its nationalist leaders used intrigue and balancing to play a weak hand superbly well. During the Cold War it was the same, as successive governments diversified their sources of foreign support and patronage. After mid 1990s, especially the U.S. government carried out economic sanctions on Sudanese government in 1997, relationship between Sudan and the Western countries has fallen down. However, Sudan has turned her eyes toward the east, and developed close relationship with China, India, Malaysia, Iran, and others. According to theory of sanctions, it is the availability of 'alternative strategy' that makes sanctions failure.<sup>①</sup> Sudan always has 'alternative strategy' by its balancing between different sides. So, to reach a comprehensive and rational solution of Darfur crisis, persuasion and exercise of soft power is better than coercion and sanction.

Secondly, given the fact that Darfur is on the leading edge of the continental demographic and religious divide, it is necessary to pay special attentions to promoting local cultural integration and education development. It is not an appropriate approach to use ideological rhetoric, for example, so-called universal human rights language, to end the issue. As far as the EU and the U.S. current approach of waving humanitarian flags to put pressure on Sudan government is concerned, there are at least two reasons. The first is that the EU and the U.S. want to play an 'ethic power' in international relations, which I will discuss further in next section. The other one is that there is a conscience shame indeed among Western governments because of their earlier failure to stop the

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<sup>①</sup> On the importance of alternative strategy in sanctions and diplomatic negotiation, see William Mark Habeeb, *Power and Tactics in International Negotiation: How Weak Nations Negotiate with Strong Nations* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).

genocide of Rwanda in 1994.<sup>①</sup> Thus they prefer to overreaction than non-action. That's why many observers criticize the EU talks a lot but does a little.<sup>②</sup> The real reason is that such an approach is overstretched and the EU can't afford the ability and will to do so, thus the only one result is to prick up the old cultural and ethnic strifes.

Third, given the influence of climate change and struggle for water and other resources, Sudanese government should establish a flexible resource allocation system so as to suit for different life style, and educate the tribesmen into a advanced way of life. Thus, international community should encourage and help it to establish a relative perfect system to distribute political power and resource wealth. However, some Western countries are pursuing an approach of supporting some groups while sanction other groups. For example, while condemning that Sudanese government supports the Arab *Janjaweed* militias, the Western countries, especially the U. S., have provided military assistances for Chad for many years, which will be discussed in detail in next section. The weapons Western countries provided are being funnelled from Chad into Darfur to support rebels who have refused to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement.<sup>③</sup> Meanwhile, with scores of Chadian soldiers defected to the rebel militias, they raise the horrific possibility that American military equipment and expertise could end up going to men aligned with the *Janjaweed*. In that case, United States military assistance to Chad, far from containing political anarchy, would only add to it.<sup>④</sup>

Fourth, Darfur crisis is not a single phenomenon, but one has close links with the instability of Sudan as a whole, especially with the Southern Sudan. Sudan is an incredibly complex country. Wars and

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<sup>①</sup> There are a lot of literatures discussed such a shameful feeling among the Western countries, see for example, Ann-Louise Colgan, "A Tale of Two Genocides: The Failed U.S. Response to Rwanda and Darfur," *Africa Action Report*, September 9, 2006; Samantha Power, "Bystanders to Genocide," *The Atlantic Monthly*, September 2001; Evelin Gerda Lindner, *The Psychology of Humiliation: Somalia, Rwanda/Burundi, and Hitler's Germany*, Doctoral Dissertation submitted to the University of Oslo, Department of Psychology, October 31, 2000, pp. 339-355; On comparison Darfur crisis with Rwanda, see Richard S. Williamson, "Darfur: Genocide in Slow Motion," *UNA-USA Occasional Paper*, No. 1, 17 (April 2006).

<sup>②</sup> Joschka Fischer, "The EU must act in Darfur," *The Guardian*, April 29, 2007, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4803&l=1>; Chris Patten, "Sudan's Crimes against Humanity Need Real EU Action, Not Empty Words," *The Irish Times*, March 28, 2007, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4744&l=1>.

<sup>③</sup> "Sudan: Arms Being Funnelled From Chad Into Darfur – Report," *The East African* (Nairobi), October 23, 2006, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200610231060.html>.

<sup>④</sup> Raffi Khatchadourian, "Blowback in Africa," *New York Times*, April 28, 2006.

coups have marked its history since it gained independence in 1956. The country is littered with killing fields, some localized and some with national and regional implications. In 2005, to end the two decades North-South war, Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM) have signed Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). However, the CPA is not fully implemented by almost all parts, especially in the oil rich region of Abyei — Sudan's "Kashmir" — astride the boundary between North and South roughly 500 miles southwest of Khartoum.<sup>①</sup> International community should pay attention to the political, security, and social situations of Sudan as a whole when they are trying to find a comprehensive solution for Darfur crisis. It is an arduous task for Sudan and international community to link Darfur crisis and the Southern Sudan and even not so outstanding Eastern Sudan together to find an 'All-Sudan solution'.<sup>②</sup>

Finally, because of the neighboring countries' importance, international efforts should include them into. Chad is the most important one of them, as stated above, Zagawa tribesmen live across the Chad-Sudan border, and weapons received from the U.S. usually enter into Sudan through this border and this part of population. Complicated by Zagawa refugees from Sudan entering into Chad and current Chadian internal conflict between government and Zagawa insurgents, this region has emerged a 'proxy war' that worsen further the instable security situation.<sup>③</sup> In addition to this, there still other neighboring countries have influences on Sudanese domestic conflict. Including all relevant neighboring countries into the negotiating process will help greatly the fair and sustainability of the final solution.

To find the cooperation space between China and the EU on Darfur issue, we need to analysis their different interests there, the foreign policy challenges posed by Darfur crisis for two parties, review their

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<sup>①</sup> Roger Winter and John Prendergast, "An All-Sudan Solution: Linking Darfur and the South," ENOUGH Strategy Paper #9, November 2007. [www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/allsudan\\_20071114.pdf](http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/allsudan_20071114.pdf); Roger Winter and John Prendergast, "Abyei: Sudan's 'Kashmir'," ENOUGH Strategy Paper #11, January 2008, [http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/aneyi%2029-1\(2\).pdf](http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/aneyi%2029-1(2).pdf); Eric Reeves, "Darfur enters the Abyss: Khartoum Renews Massive Assaults on Civilians," *Sudan Tribune*, February 13, 2008, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25943>.

<sup>②</sup> See Winter and Prendergast, "An All-Sudan Solution: Linking Darfur and the South".

<sup>③</sup> See "Echo effects: Chadian Instability and the Darfur Conflict," *Sudan Issue Briefs*, No. 9 (February 2008); "Sudan-Chad Proxy War may Destabilize the Region – UN," *Sudan Tribune*, February 8, 2008, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25884>.

diplomatic efforts first, which are the aim of the next sections.

### **III. China and EU in Sudan: Interests vs. Challenges**

The crisis lasted for 5 year in Greater Darfur has posed great challenges for the whole world, especially for those countries that have direct interests there. However, for different countries, the challenges are different because of the different interests there. As far as China and the EU's interests are concerned, there are fundamental differences between their interests in Sudan as following.

Economically, China has strong links with Sudan; although its share in China's external economic relations are very limited. The most important field of China-Sudan economic relation is oil industry. With the rapid development of Chinese economy, the needs for oil have been increasing. China took the place of Japan to be the second large oil importer and consumer of the world in 2003, next to the U.S. China's oil import dependency has increased from 30% in 2000 to 41% in 2004, to 47% in 2006, it is predicted that this figure will rise up to 50% in 2010, and 60% in 2020.<sup>①</sup> To diversify oil import sources, China has turned her eyes to Africa, including Sudan. Since the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) entered the Sudan oil industry for the first time in 1995, China's oil interests in Sudan has been continuously enlarged (see map 1, 2). Today, CNPC holds 40% shares in block 1, 2 and 4 (Operated by GNPOC), a 41% of block 3 and 7 (Operated by PDOC), 35% of Block 15 (Operated by Petronas), and 95% of block 6 (Operated by CNPCIS).<sup>②</sup>

The EU's oil interests in Sudan are smaller than that of China. Such a situation is not caused by China's competition, but by the EU's following the U.S. sanctions on Sudanese government. In this regard, the the EU's interests in Sudan oil industry are still very significant. There are several big EU oil companies operating in Sudan, for example: Lundin Petroleum (Sweden/Switzerland) has a 24,5% interest in block 5B (Operated by WNPOC-2); Total (France/Belgium) has a 32,5% interest in block B (Operated by Total); Cliveden, a Swiss company has

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<sup>①</sup> "It is predicted that China's Oil Import Dependency will reach 50%," *China News*, July 18, 2006, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2006-07/18/content\\_4848759.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2006-07/18/content_4848759.htm).

<sup>②</sup> European Coalition on Oil in Sudan, <http://www.ecosonline.org/index.cfm?event=showcompanies&page=companies>.

a 37% interest in block C, and 10% in block 15. In addition to that, among the total 12 subcontractors, there are 6 from the EU, including Bentini SpA (Italy), Royal Dutch/Shell (Netherlands/UK), Saras (Italy), Siemens (Germany), Trafigura (Netherlands/UK/Switzerland), and Weir Pumps Ltd. (UK); while china only participates into one, that is MMC (Malaysia/China/Oman).<sup>①</sup>

Besides oil industry, both China and the EU have relatively close trade relationship with Sudan. Because of the same reason of following American sanction, China-Sudan trade volume is bigger than that of EU-Sudan (see table 1).

Table 1: Sudan trade relations with China and EU (2002-2006)  
(Value in million US\$)

Year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Import					
China	254.5	310.1	558.8	1316.2	1662.4
EU	531.7	621.9	999.2	1847.3	2181.3
Export					
China	940.2	1616.1	2319.4	3323.8	4324.3
EU	148.3	183.6	172.1	209.4	129.9

Source: UNcomtrade, 2007.

Politically, both China and Sudan have suffered the ill-effects of the colonial era. This shared experience underlies the ideas of equality and respect for sovereignty that each highlight in their approach to international relations. China hopes that Sudan will not intervene into our domestic affairs, such as the Taiwan, Tibet, and others. Meanwhile, China does not agree with the view that Darfur situation should be described as “genocide”. China has consistently opposed economic sanctions on Sudan. China believes the Darfur issue is an issue related to

<sup>①</sup> Ibid.

development, where sanctions would only bring more trouble to the region.<sup>①</sup> Since the Darfur issue is a conflict between different Sudanese peoples, and nation building is a difficult process for any country, the international community has to give Sudan some time to solve this problem.<sup>②</sup>

The end of the Cold War provided the European Community/Union (EC/EU) with the opportunity to realise its ambition to become a key international actor.<sup>③</sup> To realise such an ambition, the discourse regarding the EU's policy towards Africa has taken place in two strands. The first strand of this discourse has been within the frameworks of the EU's development cooperation with ACP<sup>④</sup> states and humanitarian assistance. The second strand of this discourse was parallel to the EU's development cooperation. This was when European institutions were making efforts, in the early 1990s, towards establishing ways of preventing conflicts in Africa. Bretherton and Vogler note, in this period, many actors were particularly lobbying strongly for reinforcement of the EU's international position through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),<sup>⑤</sup> which has now become an important instrument in this regard. Thus, Sudan has become a touchstone of EU's key international actor ambition.

Parallel to political interests, the EU also has important ideological interests in Sudan. The EU foreign policy has so strong ideology tendency that Robert Kagan argues that Europeans are from Venus.' 'Europe has moved beyond power into a self-contained world of laws, rules, and negotiation, while America operates in a "Hobbesian" world

<sup>①</sup> "China says ready to work with West on Darfur," Sudan Tribune, March 6, 2008, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26250>.

<sup>②</sup> Li Anshan, "China and Africa: Policy and Challenges," *China Security*, Vol. 3 No. 3 (Summer 2007), pp. 75-76.

<sup>③</sup> See C. Hill and M. Smith, "International Relations and the European Union: Themes and Issues," in C. Hill and M. Smith eds., *International Relations and the European Union* (Oxford University Press, 2005); F. Cameron, "The EU as a Global Actor: Far from Pushing its Political Weight Around," in C. Rhodes ed., *The EU in the World Community* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp.19-44.

<sup>④</sup> The abbreviation 'ACP' refers to Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, which at present, constitutes 78 countries, including 48 of the 54 African States. The 5 Mediterranean States belong to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (1995) and South Africa has signed a specific Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU in 2000. The agreement is formally passed between the ACP group and the EC, as the EU has no legal personality yet.

<sup>⑤</sup> P. Kimunguyi, "From Lome to Cotonou: An Assessment of the European Union's Trade Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries," *Journal of International Relations*, No. 33:1-2 (July 2006).

where rules and laws are unreliable and military force is often necessary.’<sup>①</sup> A recent issue of *International Affairs*, published by Chatham House, has a series of papers on European ‘ethical power’. This project was initiated with a conference held at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, in 2005. A workshop was subsequently held at Chatham House, London, in September 2007 to discuss more specifically the various articles that make up this issue. In the beginning of the ‘Introduction’, the author quoted Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the CFSP and ESDP, that:

The peaceful unification of our continent has been our great achievement, and now our main challenge is to act as a credible force for good. From a continental agenda, we should move to a global agenda. From building peace in Europe to being a peace-builder in the world.<sup>②</sup>

Such an ideological tendency has been demonstrated by EU leaders’ speech, especially those referred to Darfur crisis. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair said in October 2004 that ‘... The international focus will not go away while this situation remains outstanding’. And Javier Solana said in May 2006:

‘The long-suffering people of Darfur need help - not next week, or next month, but today. The violence that has long terrorized the civilian population is persisting. Extreme human rights violations are continuing ... Consequently, the humanitarian situation is the worst on the planet.

‘This humanitarian and political crisis is unacceptable, an affront to our conscience. Standing by is not an option.’<sup>③</sup>

Compared with the EU, China has abandoned ideology tendency of current foreign policy since early 1980s when Chinese government adopted an independent foreign policy. Thus there is no ideological interest at all.

Given the fact of different interests in Sudan, the challenges posed by Darfur crisis for China and the EU are also different.

Economically, Darfur crisis raised serious questions on how to

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<sup>①</sup> See Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).

<sup>②</sup> Lisbeth Aggestam, “Introduction: Ethical Power Europe?,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 1 (2008), p. 1.

<sup>③</sup> Nick Grono, “Darfur: What Should the EU Do?,” Nick Grono,” Speech at the Conference on Darfur, Landstingssalen, Copenhagen, February 28, 2007, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4683&l=1>.

protect both parties' overseas interests. The difference is that such challenges are both short-term and mid-long-term for China, while mainly mid-long-term for the EU. As map 1 show, China's oil interests in Sudan mainly concentrate in Darfur and Southern Sudan where security situation is not so optimistic because of civil conflicts there. Besides that, Darfur insurgents threatened repeatedly that they will destroy the oil infrastructure and kidnap Chinese oil workers.<sup>①</sup> On the other hand, with the advocacy of the EU and the U.S., the UNSC has passed several resolutions to sanction Sudan government targeting its oil industry, which will bring negative impacts on China's oil interests there.<sup>②</sup> The real intensification of these sanctions is that Western oil companies want to re-enter Sudan, which will erode Chinese companies' advantages there. Besides the negative impacts on oil industry, Darfur crisis also raises serious consular protection challenges for Chinese government because of a large number of Chinese civilians and companies in Sudan.

For the EU, the protection of overseas economic interests in Sudan is not so urgent due to its small shares in its whole overseas economic operations. However, if the Darfur crisis will not be solved in the near future, it will create a negative environment for the EU oil companies to re-enter into Sudan and other sectors to occupy the Sudan market. Obviously, this is a long-term challenge in nature.

Politically, Darfur crisis posed serious challenges for Chinese government from two ways. The first is how to balance the principle of non-intervention of domestic affairs and take part into the process of mediating Darfur crisis. China always insists the principle of non-intervention into other's domestic affairs; however, with her international status rising, the calls for actions are higher than ever. To become a responsible stakeholder and a responsible big power of international system, it is necessary to join into international efforts for mediating international crisis and hot issues. Actually, China has been an active member for some hot issues, such as the six party talks for realizing the nuclear-free of North Korea, international cooperation on anti-terrorism, etc. Here raised the dilemma of how to influence other

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<sup>①</sup> "Darfur rebel leader plans attacks on Chinese oil firms," *Sudan Tribune*, December 8, 2007, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25075>.

<sup>②</sup> WANG Meng, "Darfur Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities for Chinese Foreign Policy Transformation," *World Economy and Politics* (Chinese), No. 6, 2005, p. 5.

country's decision without intervention into its domestic affairs. In the case of Darfur crisis, such a dilemma intensified by Western countries' pressures that ask China to compel Sudanese government to create conditions for the deployment of a UN and African Union (AU) 'hybrid peacekeeping force' in Darfur for implementing the Resolution 1769 adopted the UN Security Council On July 31, 2007, taking ground of China's economic links with Sudan.

The second is how to deal with the pressures posed by some international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that links Darfur crisis with the 2008 Beijing Olympic Game. After four years of tireless efforts, Darfur advocacy groups have had little success in pressuring the Bush administration or any other Western government to move decisively against the Sudanese government for its atrocities in Darfur. So, these groups focused instead on the '2Cs strategy' of humanitarian advocacy—China and celebrities—as a remedy.<sup>①</sup>

The first wave operation of such a strategy is in February 2007: Eric Reeves, a professor of English Language and Literature at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, published an open letter that claimed 'It's time, now, to begin shaming China'.<sup>②</sup> Ms. Mia Farrow, a good-will ambassador for the United Nations Children's Fund (UNCF), also has played a crucial role, starting a campaign at the same month to label the Games in Beijing the "Genocide Olympics" and calling on corporate sponsors and even Mr. Spielberg, who is an potential artistic adviser to China for the Games, to publicly exhort China to do something about Darfur. In a March 28, 2007 op-ed article in *The Wall Street Journal*, she warned Mr. Spielberg that he could 'go down in history as the Leni Riefenstahl of the Beijing Games,' a reference to a German filmmaker who made Nazi propaganda films.<sup>③</sup> This forced Mr. Spielberg to send a letter to Chinese President Hu Jintao four days later, in which condemns the killings in Darfur and asks the Chinese government to use its influence in the region 'to bring an end to the

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<sup>①</sup> Morton Abramowitz, Jonathan Kolieb, "Why China Won't Save Darfur," *Foreign Policy*, June 2007, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\\_id=3847](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3847); See the website of 'Olympic Dream For Darfur', <http://www.dreamfordarfur.org/>.

<sup>②</sup> Eric Reeves, "On China and the 2008 Olympic Games: An Open Letter to Darfur Activists and Advocates," February 10, 2007, <http://www.sudanreeves.org/Page-10.html>.

<sup>③</sup> Helene Cooper, "Darfur Collides With Olympics, and China Yields," *New York Times*, April 13, 2007, [http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/13/washington/13diplo.html?\\_r=1&oref=slogin](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/13/washington/13diplo.html?_r=1&oref=slogin).

human suffering there'.<sup>①</sup>

The second wave of this strategy began early this year through Mr. Spielberg's 'quit' his position of artistic adviser of the 2008, although he had not signed the recruitment letter sent by the Beijing Olympic organizing committee till May 10, 2007 and thus he has never been an artistic director to the Beijing Olympic games.<sup>②</sup>

Although all these charges and accusations are no enough evidence, '2Cs strategy' of NGOs has posed evident challenges for China's foreign policy, and had significant negative effects on Chinese national images.

For the EU, political challenges posed by Darfur also have ideological dimensions, related to how to balance humanitarian motivation and ambition of playing role of key international actor, and how to keep the credibility of the EU as a single international actor. If the EU let alone Darfur crisis and keep non-action like the case of Rwanda in 1994, then its 'ethical power' position will bankrupt totally. However, because of historical links, the EU returning Sudan is not only driven by ideological intension, but also by realistic motivation – to ensure continued access to raw materials and natural resources, and to protect economic investments already made or bring contemplated in what was now newly independent states (Ojo, 1996).<sup>③</sup> It is the dilemma of balancing ideological intension and realistic motivation that keeps the EU 'no real action, but empty words'.<sup>④</sup>

#### **IV. Efforts of China and EU for Solving Darfur Crisis**

In the past 5 years, relative parties, including China and the EU, have made great efforts to push Darfur crisis progress, although some of them failed. While China's role becomes increasingly positive, the EU pursues an approach similar to the U.S. basically, with more substantive assistance provided for the peacekeeping mission there than that of America.

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<sup>①</sup> "Darfur Activists Push Spielberg to Pressure China,"

<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12204096>.

<sup>②</sup> Scott Baldauf, Peter Ford, and Laura J. Winter, "China Speaks Out on Darfur Crisis," *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 25, 2008,

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0225/p01s03-woap.html>.

<sup>③</sup> See for example, Oladeji O. Ojo, *Africa and Europe: The Changing Economic Relationship* (London: Zed Books, 1996).

<sup>④</sup> Chris Patten, "Sudan's Crimes against Humanity Need Real EU Action, Not Empty Words".

China's efforts mainly falls into two aspects, one aimed at solving the long-term fundamental roots of Darfur crisis, the other aimed at playing a 'bridge' and 'messenger', or a 'honest broker' between Sudan and international community.

Firstly, China fully understands that Darfur is a development issue in itself that its ultimate solution is to develop Sudanese economy and to improve standards of life, thus China made great effort to address these issues.

As a resourceful country, Sudan has proven oil reserves totaling 563 million barrels, and its oil reserves are estimated at between 600 million and 1.2 billion barrels with recoverable reserves estimated at greater than 800 million barrels. The country is also rich in natural gas with reserves estimated at 3 trillion cubic feet (tcf).<sup>①</sup> However, for lacking of fund and technology, Sudan can't build its own oil industry independently. An Italian oil company and the Royal Dutch/Shell Group had done some exploration in North Sudan but failed in 1950s. After Jaafar al Nimeiri became the president of Sudan in late 1960s, he requested Chinese to help Sudan explore its oil potential. The Chinese told Nimeri at that time that it will be better if Sudan resorted to the USA which possesses the required technology and financial abilities which China did not have. One should remember that this advice was given to Sudan at the time of the Cold War. That also explains why Nimeiri resorted to the USA for a company which will explore oil for Sudan. It was Chevron which was able to prove the presence of oil in Sudan.<sup>②</sup> Unfortunately, with the sanction posed by the U.S., Chevron had to close down and the oil wells remained sealed until the starting of oil exploration in 1999 by the present government. Thus, Sudan remained as an oil importer till 2001 even they know there are abundant oil resources underground.

Sudan president Omar al Bashir asked China to help Sudan explore its oil potential again during his Beijing visit of 1995.<sup>③</sup> Since then, energy cooperation between Sudan and China has been developing rapidly, which helped greatly the development of Sudan oil industry and its social-economic progress. With CNPC entering into Sudan, the

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<sup>①</sup> "Oil and Gas," Sudan Development Program, <http://www.sdpsummit.org/sp/industry/oilgas.htm>.

<sup>②</sup> Ali Abdalla Ali, "EU, China and Africa; The Sudanese Experience," *Sudan Tribune*, July 10, 2007, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article22783>.

<sup>③</sup> "Decades Oil Dream of Sudanese," CNPC website, <http://www.cnpc.com.cn/CNPC/xwzx/shzs/hzfpj>.

volumes of Sudanese proved oil and gas reserves are increasingly mounted up, all the blocks CNPC joint venues have put into production. Meanwhile, the oil exploration and production of other blocks are much smaller than these CNPC's blocks, which is one of the reasons why the Western states always attack China on Sudan and Darfur crisis.

China not only help Sudan's oil production and exports, but also its oil industry as a whole. In 2007, China's oil investments in Sudan reached 150 billion USD. China-Sudan oil cooperation, which began in 1995, has come to include crude oil exploration and development, shipping oil pipelines, oil refining, petrochemicals, and all the other oil industry system integration in between. CNPC and Sudanese government's Ministry of Energy & Mining (MEM) has concluded an agreement on building the Sudan Khartoum Refinery Company (KRC) that finished in 2000. In July 2006, CNPC announced the completion of the Khartoum refinery expansion project, which doubled the refinery's capacity from 50,000 bbl/d to 100,000 bbl/d. The Khartoum refinery processes Nile blend crude, which has a low sulfur content and high fuel-yield. The additional refinery capacity from the expansion should help alleviate the short supply of refined products available in Sudan, while giving the country some additional export capacity.<sup>①</sup>

Energy cooperation between China and Sudan has expanded into other social-economic fields that helped Sudan to build a more comprehensive and balanced national economy. The El Gaili Power Station is a large gas and oil-fired power plant planned by the Sudanese MEM and Sudan National Electricity Corporation. This power station was to be built over four phases. For the first phase, the total contract value was \$149 million and the installed capacity 200,000 kw. When it went into service in August 2004, its generation capacity accounted for approximately one third of Sudan's national total at the time. Today, the second phase of the project with the same installed capacity of the first phase was finished in late 2007, which will meet the electricity needs of the whole Khartoum city.<sup>②</sup> The Merowe Dam project, which is to produce 1,250 megawatts of electricity, is also helped by Chinese companies and will be finished in 2008. The Merowe Dam is intended to

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<sup>①</sup> "Sudan's Khartoum Refinery Expanded, Sees Gasoline Exports," *Sudan Tribune*, July 10, 2006, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article16587>.

<sup>②</sup> "Sudan Oil Minister Says Energy Cooperation with China Fruitful," *Sudan Tribune*, July 16, 2007, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article22865>.

roughly double Sudan's power supply and help irrigate land that is now barely arable.<sup>①</sup>

Most importantly, as Sudanese Minister of Energy and Mining Awad Ahmed Al-Jaz said that,

The Chinese Government and a batch of Chinese enterprises, represented by the CNPC, have established a unique model of cooperation with the Sudanese Government and enterprises over time. Under this model, the Chinese Government and enterprises not only provide capital, technology, and equipment for Sudan, but also attach great importance to Sudan's human resources development.<sup>②</sup>

In fact, all the projects that the Chinese companies have invested in so far around Sudan are actively training and employing local Sudanese employees, to translate into action the consensus of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation on human resources development. China-Sudan energy cooperation has provided more than 100,000 job opportunities for local people directly. According to a report in October 2007, Sudanese workers in the oil field constitute now more than: 90% in GNPOC consortium; 87% in Petrodar; 67% in Khartoum refinery.<sup>③</sup> With 50:50 shares with MEM, CNPC takes charge of KRC's management. By gradual trainings of Sudanese staffs, the Khartoum refinery has stably localized since its operation in 2000, and the number of Chinese staffs also has step down simultaneously.<sup>④</sup> Chinese enterprises pay high attention to training of Sudanese workers and staffs. CNPC has elected 35 Sudanese students to enter into universities of Beijing city, costing 1.5 million US\$. Now, they all have gained their undergraduate, Master, or Ph. D. degree.<sup>⑤</sup>

In the past several years, CNPC donated about 2.7 million US dollars, to build up the KRC Friendship Hospital, Fula Hospital and Palouge Hospital etc, which consequently improved greatly the medical conditions of the local people. CNPC through its subsidiary companies built 22 schools and 156 water pools for local dwellers. And recently

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<sup>①</sup> "Sudanese People are the Most Beneficiaries of China-Sudan Energy Cooperation," Khartoum, Xinhua Net, January 17, 2007, <http://www.cnpc.com.cn/cnode/hzygy/jlhz>. Marc Lacey, "MEROWE DAM - A race Against Time to Save Sudan's Past from Progress," *The New York Times*, May 31, 2005.

<sup>②</sup> "Sudan Oil Minister Says Energy Cooperation with China Fruitful".

<sup>③</sup> "Sudanization of Oil Jobs," *Sudan Inside*, October 26, 2007, <http://sudaninside.com/category/economy>.

<sup>④</sup> "CNPC in Sudan".

<sup>⑤</sup> *Ibid*.

CNPC contributed 10 million US dollars to Sudanese government for the construction of the Maravi Bridge on Nile River. According to a undercount statistics, over 1.5 million Sudan residents benefited from all these welfare establishments.<sup>①</sup>

Secondly, Chinese government also fully realized the emergency of find a comprehensive solution for Darfur crisis, want to extend a 'helping hand', towards solving the Darfur conflict, and 'ready to cooperate with the government of Sudan, the United Nations, the AU (African Union), regional countries and all the other important stakeholders,' for a permanent solution to the conflict.<sup>②</sup>

Ending the Darfur conflict requires much more than what China alone can offer. The Western states and NGOs put too higher hopes on China, as well as they exaggerated China's limited arms sale to Sudan.<sup>③</sup> As some Western scholars and observers noted, in regard to Western NGOs' '2Cs strategy', that:

Yes, China has the economic leverage to gain the ear of President Bashir, but that hardly means it has the ability to bully him into accepting a large U.N. peacekeeping contingent in Darfur...And, even if China were capable of delivering Bashir, the Sudanese government is not the only impediment to an effective peace process. Nowadays, more people may well be dying from tribal clashes than from marauding janjaweed or government forces. The infighting of fractured rebel groups and the sheer number of displaced people with no homes to return to are also immediate and significant obstacles to peace. But China has little influence over the rebel movements and is ill-positioned to act as a mediator between them.<sup>④</sup>

Additionally, the fragmentation of the rebel groups has greatly impeded the Darfur peace process. Of the five key Darfur rebel groups, only two have agreed to unify their positions and join the peace talks, stalled since the failed summit in Libya in October 2007. Meanwhile, the two key rebel factions, the JEM – the biggest military group — and the

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<sup>①</sup> Ibid.

<sup>②</sup> "Envoy Liu Guijin Said China Would be External Bridge for Sudan," *Zaobao*, February 24, 2008, [http://realtime.zaobao.com/2008/02/080224\\_35.shtml](http://realtime.zaobao.com/2008/02/080224_35.shtml).

<sup>③</sup> "Media Exaggerate China's Limited Arms Sale to Sudan – Envoy," *Sudan Tribune*, February 23, 2008, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26094>.

<sup>④</sup> Morton Abramowitz, Jonathan Kolieb, "Why China Won't Save Darfur," *Foreign Policy*, June 2007, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\\_id=3847](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3847); Alex de Waal, "China and Sudan: Defining the Turning Point," *Sudan Tribune*, February 24, 2008, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26089>.

SLM led by Abdel-Wahid Mohamed al-Nur, were still putting conditions on attending any talks.<sup>①</sup>

Even though, Chinese government still responsibly mediates between Sudan and the Western states.

1. China has been working closely with the United Nations to resolve the Darfur crisis through political means, said the ambassador. On July 31, 2007, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1769, authorizing the deployment a hybrid UN and African Union (AU) force in Darfur, which marks a great achievement in the settlement of the crisis there. China helped push forward the Sudanese government, the AU and the UN reaching consensus on the resolution on the hybrid force to Darfur. From mid-2006, Chinese government began to persuade President Bashir to moderate his position. In their two times of meeting, at the first China-Africa Summit in November 2006 and Chinese President Hu Jintao's Sudan visit in February 2007, Hu talked to president Bashir about Chinese concerns of Darfur crisis, and hoped Sudan government to accept the arrangement of a hybrid UN-AU forces.<sup>②</sup> Sudan government agreed to accept it in mid 2007, which did not come easily and Chinese efforts have been applauded by the international community. China has contributed 315 engineers for supporting that force.

2. The Chinese government has also maintained sound communication with the Sudanese government, held discussions with it on the basis of respect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity. China sees to it that the concerns of the Sudanese government are heard, while conveying to the government the international community's concern over Darfur. In May 2007, Chinese government appointed Ambassador Liu Guijin, one of the top Africanists, as a special envoy - very rare in its foreign policy structure - for Darfur, in order to promote its early solution. The dual-track strategy, initiated by China, is designed to push forward political negotiations and the peacekeeping mission in Darfur in a balanced manner.

3. In order to improve the humanitarian situation in Darfur, China has provided material assistance worth 100 million RMB (about 13.8

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<sup>①</sup> Victor Tanner and Jerome Tubiana, *Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2007); "Chinese envoy urges pressure on Darfur rebels," *Sudan Tribune*, February 27, 2008, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26168>.

<sup>②</sup> Gareth Evans and Donald Steinberg, "China and Darfur: 'Signs of Transition'," *Guardian Unlimited*, June 11, 2007, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4891&l=1>.

million U.S. dollars) to Darfur, 1.8 million U.S. dollars aid to African Union, and 500,000 U.S. dollars donation to the U.N. fund for solving Darfur issue, and Chinese firms have also offered help.<sup>①</sup>

In February 2008, when the ‘resignation’ of Mr. Spielberg caused international attention, Chinese government decided to use this opportunity to let international community understand Darfur situation more truly and concretely. Chinese envoy Liu visited Sudan and its former suzerain British to exchange views. During these visits, ambassador Liu has put forward some constructive plans and suggestions for solving Darfur crisis. He pointed out that, the progress of hybrid mission and solution of Darfur crisis need multilateral efforts: firstly, Sudanese government should cooperate further with international community, and show more flexibility on some technical issues; secondly, rebel groups of Darfur area should return to the negotiation table; thirdly, international community, including some Western countries, should use their influence to persuade relevant forces respectively; fourth, as two important players of a tripartite mechanism, U.N. and the AU should strengthen consultation with Sudanese government, exchange views with it more frequently, and take more pro-active attitudes to find solutions for specific problems.<sup>②</sup>

The EU also made great efforts for solving Darfur crisis. Firstly, to promote its idealistic goals and become an ‘ethical power’, the EU put heavy pressures to bully Sudanese government because of its sympathism to the ‘weaker’ in Darfur. The EU parliament has passed several resolutions to address the Darfur crisis, accusing that it was the Sudanese government’ support to Arab militia Janjaweed that worsen the security situation, block the deployment of UN-AU hybrid force, and failed the international humanitarian assistances.<sup>③</sup> To put greater pressures on Sudanese government, the EU actively pushed the UNSC to pass various resolutions. on March 31, 2005, UNSC passed resolution No. 1593(2005) to,

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<sup>①</sup> “China Makes Constant Efforts to Resolve Crisis in Darfur – Envoy,” *Sudan Tribune*, February 17, 2008, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25995> ; “China provides more humanitarian aid to Darfur,” *Sudan Tribune*, February 26, 2008, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26144>.

<sup>②</sup> “China not Seeking Expediency from Darfur Issue,” *China Daily* (Chinese), February 25, 2008, p. 3.

<sup>③</sup> “European Parliament resolution on the situation in Darfur,” *Sudan Tribune*, February 15, 2007, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article20312>.

1. *Decides* to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court;

2. *Decides* that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully;

3. *Invites* the Court and the African Union to discuss practical arrangements that will facilitate the work of the Prosecutor and of the Court, including the possibility of conducting proceedings in the region, which would contribute to regional efforts in the fight against impunity.<sup>①</sup>

It is important to note here that the EU is the main advocate for refer the Darfur situation to ICC.<sup>②</sup> According to resolutions of UNSC and its own, the EU has posed arms embargo upon Sudanese government and sanction on 4 individuals.<sup>③</sup>

Secondly, the EU also provided great support for peacekeeping mission in Darfur. The EU has made active support for the Abuja peace talks leading to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). From its early involvement, when it helped broker the N'djamena ceasefire, the EU has steadily increased its diplomatic activity in relation to Sudan, as well as its operational support to AMIS (see details below). The EU, which has been assigned a specific role in the agreement, will continue to play a crucial part in its implementation - notably in the *Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation* (DDDC) process and in the *Darfur Assessment and Evaluation Commission*, and by providing assistance for post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation efforts. The EU also appointed its Special Representative for Sudan, Mr Torben Brylle, in May 2007, to ensure coordination and coherence of the EU's contributions to AMIS. The EU has made the greatest contribution to AMIS by committing over €435m in total, and deployed almost 100 personnel in support of the military component of AMIS and a further 50

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<sup>①</sup> S/RES/1593(2005), Security Council, United Nations, March 31, 2005,

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/292/73/PDF/N0529273.pdf?OpenElement>.

<sup>②</sup> "European Union Response to the Darfur Crisis," European Union Factsheet, December 2007, <http://www.eurunion.org/newsweb/HotTopics/DarfurEUFactsheetDec2007.doc>.

<sup>③</sup> Nick Grono, "Darfur: What Should the EU Do?," Speech at the Conference on Darfur, Landstingsalen, Copenhagen, February 28, 2007, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4683&l=1>.

in support of the civilian police component.<sup>①</sup> On 28 January 2008, the EU has decided to launch a bridging military operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In deciding to conduct this operation the EU is stepping up its longstanding action in support of efforts to tackle the crisis in Darfur as part of a regional approach to that crisis.

Thirdly, the EU has provided around €1 billion for alleviating the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Most resources have been provided for humanitarian assistance, including food aid and aid to Darfur refugees in neighbouring Chad. The European Commission alone has allocated €282 million in humanitarian support. EU Member States have provided around €12 million in support of the political process. Contributions to the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) amount to approximately €325 million, including funding from the African Peace Facility of €12 million.<sup>②</sup>

Both China and the EU have made great efforts to promote the solving of Darfur crisis. Given the difficulties of cooperation caused by different perspectives on the roots and nature of the crisis, and different approaches and principles, it is necessary to find the common space for cooperation between two parties.

## **V. Conclusion: The Space for Cooperation**

Given the facts that Darfur situation is still unstable and the UN-AU hybrid force has not been fully deployed, there is still a relatively long way to go to reach a comprehensive solution for Darfur crisis and diplomatic efforts of every part need to be improved further.

As far as Chinese diplomatic efforts in Darfur issue are concerned, there are at least two aspects needed to be improved. Firstly, Chinese government needs to give more publicity of its foreign policy; in other words, China should increase propaganda or transparency of its foreign policy. To a great extent, Chinese approach for solving Darfur crisis is correct and has the potential of providing the long-term solution for it. It is a pity that Chinese government often publicizes these efforts after the Western states and NGOs attacks, especially linking the Darfur crisis

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<sup>①</sup> "European Union Response to the Darfur Crisis".

<sup>②</sup> Ibid.

with Beijing Olympic Games. Such a response often gives the Western states and NGOs an impression that '2Cs strategy' is effective and courage them to continue it.<sup>①</sup>

Secondly, Chinese government should enhance cooperation with other relevant parties. China insists in persuading and influencing and opposes coercive measures because of adherence to non-intervention principle, which isolates China from the Western states. Without effective propaganda, the result is that Chinese government fights alone without any support of the Western countries. Furthermore, because the EU and the U.S. has similar standpoints on Darfur crisis that didn't proved their effectiveness; this provided for them a good opportunity to accused China without any negative effects on their own political image.

As to the EU's efforts, there are two deficiencies too. Firstly, the EU usually talks more than acts mainly attribute to its idealistic and ideological goals. Secondly, the EU's coercive approach proved not working. One determinant factor is the EU short of political will and physical capability to enforce sanction, the other is Sudan has relatively enough 'alternative' strategy. Thus, the EU should do more concrete things and show more flexible attitude.

To solve Darfur crisis effectively, both China and the EU need to cooperate each other, and improve their diplomatic approach respectively according to the 'should-be' solution described above. Thus, we can find that there are several potential fields for China-EU cooperation:

Firstly, both China and the EU should reach consensus on how to solve the Darfur crisis, and persuade the U.S. join into their common efforts. Such an approach should be a political, peaceful, and non-coercive way by using influence of soft power but not hard power.

Secondly, both China and the EU have important economic interests there; therefore have large political influence on Sudan government and even the rebel groups. Both parties should cooperate to promote Sudan government and rebel groups to conclude and abide by a comprehensive peace accord in greater Darfur area.

Thirdly, China and the EU should push forward together a strategy of facilitating integration of Sudan domestic cultures and ethnics and races, which is the natural need of the fact that Darfur crisis is an

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<sup>①</sup> Gareth Evans and Donald Steinberg, "China and Darfur: 'Signs of Transition'," *Guardian Unlimited*, June 11, 2007, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4891&l=1>.

indispensable component of the internal turbulence of Sudan as a whole. Both China and EU are examples of multiculturalism, their experiences and lessons will contribute to Sudan's cultural and ethnical integration, and therefore its peace and stability. Moreover, if such a strategy can be successful, it will be generalized to apply to all domestic turbulent states on the African continent, or at least provide important reference.

Fourth, both parties should promote together the communication between Sudan and relevant international organizations, especially the AU and UN. Because of its regional influences, such effort will create friendly conditions for Darfur issue, particularly for stability of Chad-Sudan border.

Finally, but not the least, Sudan's instability has deeper roots of unfair distribution of wealth and natural resources that often puzzled those newly modernized countries. In this regard, EU has realized modernization for a long time and China is underway of that process, experiences and lessons of EU and China will contribute a lot to Sudan and other Africa countries' modernization process.


Cooperation between China and the EU on Darfur crisis has very profound meanings for both sides. For China, it will promote our foreign propaganda, improve our national image, and set an example for future cooperation with other parties. For EU, it functions as a medium to hide its ideological and realistic goals, a show of flexibility, and a real action but not just talking in Darfur. We have enough reasons to hope its bright future.

Map 1: Oil in Sudan



Source: European Coalition on Oil in Sudan,  
[http://www.ecosonline.org/back/pdf\\_reports/Maps/Soedan%20A5%20zw.pdf](http://www.ecosonline.org/back/pdf_reports/Maps/Soedan%20A5%20zw.pdf).

Map 2: CNPC in Sudan



Source: "Energize Harmonize Realize," CNPC website, <http://www.cnpc.com.cn/Resource/ZT/%E4%BC%81%E4%B8%9A%E7%A4BE%E4%BC%9A%E8%B4%A3%E4%BB%BB/2006%E5%B9%B4%E4%BC%81%E4%B8%9A%E7%A4BE%E4%BC%9A%E8%B4%A3%E4%BB%BB%E6%8A%A5%E5%91%8A.pdf>